A Discourse of Threat? : A Textual Analysis of the U.S. Report "Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba" by Davies, Johanna Maria
                       A Discourse of Threat?
— A Textual Analysis of the U.S. Report
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
Johanna Maria Davies
Master´s Thesis
Department of Sociology
University of Helsinki
2006-05-02
2Table of Contents
1. Introduction 3
2. The Research on the U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Cuba 8
2.1. Research on the U.S. Foreign Policy— Searching for Stories 9
2.2. The U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric: Is Abstract Enmity Necessary? 12
3. The Relationship between the United States and Cuba— Foes Forever? 15
3.1. The Threat That Used to Be the Apple of the U.S. Eye 16
3.2. From Independence to the Revolution
— U.S. Ambassadors and Cuban Dictators 18
3.3. The U.S.— Cuba Relations from 1959 to the Present 20
4. The Research Material and Tools for Analysing the Report 23
4.1. About the Report as the Research Material 24
4.2. Textual Analysis as the “Research Method” 26
4.2.1. Sociosemiotic Analysis with A.J. Greimas 28
4.2.2. Argumentation Analysis as a Device to Discoveries 30
5.   The Threats Apparent in the Actantial Models 34
6.   How the Threat Is Created in the Report "Commission for
   Assistance to a Free Cuba" 39
6.1. The American Facts, Truths and Presumptions about Cuba as a Threat 41
6.2. The Threatened U.S. Value Hierarchies 45
6.3. The Argumentation Techniques for Creating the Threat Discourse 50
6.4. How the Report Ignites Passion 57
7.   Conclusions— "Freedom Is Not Free" 59
7.1. Conclusions on the U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric on Cuba
and the Castro Regime 59
7.1.1. A Discourse of Threat 61
7.2. On Research Moral and Ethics 65
7.3. Development Possibilities— Quo Vadis Cuba? 66
References 67
Attachment 1 74
31. Introduction
"There are no borders in this fight to the death; we cannot be indifferent to what is happening
in any part of the world." —Ernesto 'Che' Guevara
The United States’ foreign policy is an important (though not overriding) practice in
international politics. As one reads news about the foreign affairs almost anywhere in the
world, the United States is frequently mentioned there too. It is a very active country
world-wide. This activity has increasingly caused discussion— and the tone has started to
sound more and more negative. Why is the United States so active in its foreign policy? What
kind of values forms the basis of its policy?
Foreign policies are important practices of security. As the security is dealt with, also the
threats enter the discussion. The main concept of this thesis is “threat”, and it establishes the
core of the research questions. The main research question is the following: How is Cuba
constructed as a threat in the foreign policy rhetoric of the United States? Furthermore, I
examine as what kind of threat Cuba is presented. Lastly, I ask why this threat is created.
I find it especially important to analyse the U.S. rhetoric concerning Cuba which has been
neglected here in Finland. This neglect is understandable for it seems like nothing new has
occurred in the policies between the respective countries. However, I argue that the
Commission for Assistance to a free Cuba -report1, which serves as the research material for
this Master's Thesis, is already a diplomatic action between Cuba and the United States that
deserves attention.
1 The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba –report (2004) is found in the WebPages of the U.S.
government: http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/c12237.htm (2005-10-26).
4According to David Campbell (Kuusisto 1998, 18), fear is a common element in the foreign
policy of the U.S. government. It is used to convince people of the justification of U.S.
actions. Similar threats seem to be employed in the U.S. foreign policy rhetoric all around the
world2.
However, I do not want to increase the prevalent anti-Americanism in any way3, and I would
be delighted to find other kinds of results. Maybe the American suggestions are the only
realistic ones available. Therefore, I find it very important to try to interpret the U.S. actions
in as neutral light as possible without compromising any needed criticism.
I examine— in a similar way that Campbell (1992) did in his book Writing Security— the way
in which the identity of the United States has been written through foreign policies operating
in its name. Instead of asking how United States foreign policy serves the national interest, I
study how, through the writing of threat, the U.S. foreign policy helps to produce (and
reproduce) the ethical borders of its identity and the territorial boundaries of the state.
(Campbell 1992, vii.)
This study examines the United States’ foreign policy in respect to Cuba, because— as
Scheer and Zeitlin (1964, 9) crystallized it— (1) “the Cuban crisis epitomizes the failure and
dangers of much of the United States’ foreign policy.” Furthermore, (2) the analysis of the
conflict between the respective countries has been neglected since the Cold War ended.
2 See about the U.S. foreign policy rhetoric for example the Master's Thesis of Erästö (2005, 16-24).
3 See about anti-Americanism e.g. International Herald Tribune November 26-27, 2005. Cohen, Robert:
Anti-Americanism is one 'ism' that thrives, page 2.
5Other reasons for choosing Cuba as the research target when examining the rhetoric of the
United States in its foreign policy are (3) the long-lasting economical conflict between the
island state and the superpower, (4) the underlying potential of a concrete military conflict as
the leader of the socialist Cuba— Fidel Castro— passes away, and (5) the world wide media
seems presently disinterested in this conflict. Now, however, during a time of peace, one can
expect a certain transparency when dealing with the issue4. Whereas, during a possible
conflict in the future, it will become more difficult to get varied information on the situation.
In addition, if we start to analyse the Cuban social structure and the will of the people when
Fidel Castro passes away— as the media will most likely do— it will be less beneficial. Then
the United States will probably implement its own agenda in Cuba because it is the only one
that is immediately available5. I am not saying that the U.S. agenda could not be the most
suitable one, but in order to know its relevance, we have to analyse it. As the Albert Einstein
Institute6 declares:
“The need for analyses of non-violent action is great. Conflicts involving non-violent
struggle are often severe, the opponents frequently ruthless, the costs at times quite
high. However, through better understanding of the particular dynamics of non-violent
action, wise planning, and careful strategic judgment, the risks to non-violent resisters
can be reduced, and the effectiveness of their actions and chances of success can be
dramatically increased.”
I will examine the U.S. foreign policy by studying the argumentation of the United States to
the current and future societal structure of Cuba in the report Commission for Assistance to a
4 See for example Luostarinen (1994) on the availability of information during conflict times.
5 As we have been able to witness in the case of Iraq starting in 2003.
6 The Albert Einstein Institution is established to advance the study and use of strategic nonviolent action in
conflicts throughout the world. Read more about the institution from their website: http://www.aeinstein.org/
(2005-12-31).
6free Cuba (henceforth referred as the “Report” with a possible reference page in parentheses).
The research method is, therefore, a textual analysis. This remains as a fairly little studied
perspective in the research concerning the conflict between the respective countries. The
argumentation is examined, as I already mentioned, by analysing the Report Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba prepared by the U.S. government in the summer of 2004.
Why is the United States so keen to intervene in the politics of Cuba? Is it for the good of the
Cuban people, as the Report states in the beginning, or is it something else? There are
probably as many reasons as there are people involved. The aim of this work, however, is not
to find out the main reason for this interest but to understand the logic and values behind the
statements in the Report.
In this paper, as I study Cuba as a threat presented by the United States, I analyse the current
state of tensions between these two countries, and the reasons behind them. I examine the
conflict from a sociosemiotic point of view because I am of the opinion that reality just does
not come across symbolically but it is maintained, even produced, in discourse. I believe that
in its official documents the U.S. produces a certain kind of image of Cuba which reflects the
U.S. interests. This image largely reflects the existing standpoints in the U.S. today. By
analysing this particular document I wish to find those images and bring them to light.
On the one hand people's images are presented in the official documents and on the other
hand the official documents affect people's opinions7. Therefore, it is important to critically
analyse this image even if we are talking about countries geographically far away from
Europe. As the words of Che Guevara in the beginning of this chapter state, “we cannot be
indifferent to what is happening in any part of the world” when it comes to saving (or losing,
in the case of ignorance) the lives of real human beings.
7 Maybe again these images from the U.S. have a more wide-spread influence on the opinion of the democratic
countries in the world. Even though at the moment the EU is leading opposing politics in the issues concerning
Cuba thanks to the new prime minister Zapatero. See e.g. Similä (27.10.2005) www.kuuba.orgà Cuba Sí
àYhteiskunta & Politiikkaà Kuuba-Espanja-USA (2005-10-26).
7The relationship between reality, discourse, and values is an essential part of the
intelligibility of society. The semiotic interpretation takes into careful consideration the fact
that in the process of understanding reality (produced in discourse) values are arranged from
a certain perspective. We cannot, for example, explain the changes in a particular society
without taking into consideration how the values— positive and negative— are arranged in
that society. (Sulkunen 1997, 13-18.) In many different arenas there are many differing
viewpoints on the reality of Cuba going on. In this study I analyse the American process of
understanding the reality in Cuba by studying the Report.
The outline of my thesis is divided into five parts. In the first part, Chapter 2, I link my study
to the research done on the United States' foreign policy— especially towards Cuba. I depict
some most important observations on the research done on the argumentation of the United
States in its foreign policy. Then, in the second part, Chapter 3, I briefly introduce the
relationship between the United States and Cuba as much as is needed for understanding the
situation today and the U.S. need for depicting Cuba as a threat.
In the third part, Chapter 4, I begin by presenting the Report that serves as the material for the
research. Then I introduce the methodological tools which I use in chapters 5 and 6 to analyse
the material. Firstly, I introduce Greimas' sociosemiotic analysis which, in Chapter 5, helps
me to find the answer to the first research question of this study: as what kind of threat Cuba
is presented. Secondly, I introduce Perelman's argumentation analysis and Törrönen's
pending narrative, both of which I use in Chapter 6 to discover an answer to the second
research question: how Cuba is created as a threat in the Report (and more broadly, in the
foreign policy rhetoric of the United States).
In the fourth part, in chapters 5 and 6, I combine the topics, which I have dealt with separately,
and I analyse the material. Finally in the last part of the study, Chapter 7, I briefly discuss the
research ethics of this Thesis as well as the criticism. In this chapter, however, the main
attempt is to answer the third research question: why Cuba is created as a threat.
82. The Research on the U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric and Cuba
"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders are targets of far greater importance than
the bodies of his troops." — Mao Tse-Tung
In Finnish sociological studies neither Cuba nor the U.S. foreign policy has been a very
popular topic. Instead, some research on Cuba has been conducted at least in the field of
history, literary research (Siltala 1994, 3) and pedagogics (Simola 1984), and a great deal of
research on the U.S. foreign policy has been conducted into international politics. Many
researches on the rhetoric of the U.S. foreign policy have been conducted as well. For
example, Heli Salonen (2005) has written her Master's thesis on the rhetoric of the Presidents
Bush and Clinton, whereas, Päivi Nevala (2000) has studied in her thesis the national
interests of the United States in its politics concerning China. In her thesis Salonen (2005, 88)
concluded that the need for the rhetorical analysis concerning the U.S. foreign policy
continues to be great.
This study could be classified to the sociology of international politics. It combines the
theoretical tools from semiotic sociology and rhetorical analysis— to which I return in
Chapter 4 and 5— and deals with a topic of international politics8. This study uses the gained
knowledge from both fields and attempts to introduce something new to them as well.
8 According to Immanuel Wallerstein (1991) the division between the social sciences should be abandoned. The
aim of sociology is to look at the present society (also the “international society”) from the historical
perspective because the societies are historically developed and geographically located. Also dividing the
society into different spheres of life (economy, state, individuals) is artificial because all of them influence each
other. He continues that all the societies are somehow connected to each other and should, therefore, be
92.1. Research on the U.S. Foreign Policy— Searching for Stories
Petri Minkkinen (2004), a researcher from the University of Helsinki, deals with the politics
of the current President of the United States, George W. Bush in his dissertation (Kaktus,
Bush & Pohjois-Amerikan tulevaisuus. Kriittinen avointen historiallisten kontekstien
tutkimus ja muutoksellinen politiikka). Minkkinen presumes that the government of Bush has
tried to create a new world empire with the aid of new liberal politics. He concludes that this
policy cannot last for long due to its contradictions and that it would not even benefit the
United States if it could. The United States has lost the respect of the other social actors and is
now forced to use power and violence to maintain its hegemony. According to Minkkinen,
there is no return to the old system. Instead, the U.S. can only choose between new
imperialism and emancipatory politics. Would the democratic regionalism, that Minkkinen
offers, be the solution in the situation of Cuba? Perhaps, but pondering on that is outside the
scope of this thesis. What is important in this work is that it brings out the current identity
crisis of the United States.
Another current discussion on the U.S. foreign policy is found in the collection of articles
(Yhdysvaltain hegemonia: Messiaaninen suurvalta ja sen vastavoimat) written by the team
of writers of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and edited by the senior
researcher Henrikki Heikka (2005). These articles were columns written to the national
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat last summer (2005) and addressed the “hegemonial identity”
of the United States. In addition to the hegemony of the United States, the series concentrated
also on the reactions it has caused in different parts of the world.
According to Joseph Nye the leadership of the United States has been successful due to the
desirability of its values and ideals. The U.S. has used its own example— in other words, soft
power— to  get  the  others  to  act  according  to  its  wishes.  However,  during  the  Bush
examined as a part of the world system. Last, the change of societies is not necessarily progressive, which is
why I want to scrutinize the possible change of Cuban society that the American government is aiming at.
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administration the use of force has been more apparent than the ideals. Nye argues that this is
the reason for the current dislike directed towards the American hegemony. (Heikka 2005,
6.)
The articles do not, however, discuss the situation of Cuba nor Latin America in general. In a
way, this thesis can be seen as a continuation of this series of articles as well, as it addresses
the state of the hegemonial identity of the United States. I will come back to the themes
brought up in the articles in Chapter 5 and 6 as I analyse the Report.
The centring of the individual is a prominent theme in the foreign policy discourse of the
United States (Campbell 1992, 278). Geoffrey Hawthorn (in Campbell 1992, 279) has argued
that the United States’ conception of self as the individual derives in part from the character
of the U.S. revolution. Without the kind of old order that was being attacked in Europe— no
equivalent of the European estates or the established church— the U.S. society was “merely
individuals, with or without property, and government”.
One important consequence in the politics of the United States was a very special sense of
time. For Europeans hope lay in the future and the prospect of a new order. Whereas, for the
U.S. public, whose social and political order had begun in a historical vacuum and been
secured through a revolution, a concern with space is more central than time. The territorial
space— and its expansion— has been privileged over temporal, historical or social relations.
“[The] US identity is constituted geopolitically, through the securing of a particular
space in which individuals reside. A geopolitical reading is thus more than an
economical means of interpreting the ambiguity of global life. Geopolitical
representational practices are practices of statecraft central to the constituting of the
United States.” (Campbell 1992, 279.)
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Representational practices are highly used to constitute the United States. However, only
lately have researchers of international politics started to take these practices seriously and
started to enforce semiotic methods in analysing them. It is not for long that the research on
international politics has begun to discern foreign policy in terms of storytelling, which again
means that much more research is needed. Researchers like David Campbell (1990, 1992),
Michael Shapiro (1992), and Hayward Alker (1996) have been the pioneers in this field.
They have shown in their studies how, with the help of foreign policy, one creates symbolic
boundaries and makes the others foreign, and furthermore legitimates the power relating to
domestic policy. (Kuusisto 1998, 13.)
Foreign political stories can vary greatly. When dealing with countries far away, i.e. different
cultures and abstract values, only a rare amount of the “great audience” can base their
opinions and beliefs on direct observations and personal experiences. In numerous large
questions they have to trust the explaining stories of the reliable sources, who they consider
to be alike and aware of the situation (Kuusisto 1998, 14).
When a country wants to commit to a certain issue (as the United States has shown its
willingness to commit to the helping of Cuban people to regain their independence), it has to
first create the events as events that seem somehow threatening, then name and define them
and finally connect them to stories that support their reaction options. Choosing a relevant
story and marketing it as early as possible is important because all the basic stories have their
own plot, own role positions and own natural result. The leaders need convincing stories to
back up their actions. (Kuusisto 1998, 16.)
This is exactly what the U.S. has done in the Report. They have chosen a relevant story about
Cuba (of all the possible ones that exist) and marketed it early enough (in other words, well
before Castro has passed away). Therefore, in this study, I want to continue the semiotic
interpretation of international politics by analysing this Report with the help of theorists like
Campbell and Shapiro.
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2.2. The U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric: Is Abstract Enmity Necessary?
To David Campbell, fear, danger and separation are the keywords of foreign policy in
general. Dangerous and alien elements are actively created as threats to the other(s) so that
the existence of the country and its own people would become justified. (Kuusisto 1998, 14.)
Also in Campbell’s work the foreign policy is seen as a significant part of the identity
creation of a country. He has argued that, for example, the form of international order known
as the Cold War was an attempt to discipline the ambiguity of global life so as to secure
always-fragile identities (Campbell 1990, 264).
The boundaries of the state have been the result of transferring the differences within society
to the differences between societies. During the Cold War the identity of the United States
became even more apparent in the external boundaries of the state. The 1930s and 1940s
(from the depression to the Cold War) were a critical rupture in the identity of the United
States that demanded a considerable effort to reproduce an earlier identity. The Cold War
thus needs to be understood as a strategy that was global in scope but national in design.
Rather than reacting to an external realm of necessity, the Cold War was connected to the
constitution of that external realm. (Campbell 1992, 273.)
The Cold War is over but the identity creation still happens by defining the external realm of
the country. The Report is a part of the current discourse, and therefore, a part of this identity
construction. As Campbell (1990, 268) continues, the U.S. foreign policy cannot be
understood as a fixed entity. It has changed in many ways depending on the given historical
circumstances. However, it has also demonstrated certain continuities:
“[I]mportant is the constantly shifting characterization of the threat. Despite
considerable differences in the order of magnitude of each, US policymakers have so
tagged world communism, the economic disintegration of Europe, Red China, North
Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya, terrorists, drug smugglers, and so on over the years.
None of these sources poses a threat in terms of a traditional calculus of (military)
13
power, and none can be reduced solely to the Soviet Union. All of them, however, are
understood in terms of their location in an anarchic realm. Moreover, an examination
of the foreign policy discourse suggests that the absence of order in the international
system is considered a basic problem for US foreign policy.”  (Italics in the original
text, Campbell 1990, 268.)
As  said,  the  Cold  War  has  ended  but  the  need  to  secure  the  U.S.  identity  still  exists.
According to Campbell this happens with the characterization of the threat, for example, as
terrorism9. Campbell (1992, 271) has remarked that assessments of threat in foreign policy
discourse regularly begin with considerations on culture, ideology, and general reflections on
the U.S. society.
“The constant reaffirmation of the character of US society and the individual in foreign
policy discourse suggests, according to this argument, that the practices of foreign
policy serve to enframe, limit, and domesticate a particular meaning of humanity. The
identity thus enframed refers to more than just the characteristics of individuals or
national types; it incorporates the form of domestic order, the social relations of
production, and the various subjectivities to which they give rise. In the context of the
United States, this concept of humanity is circumscribed by the rhetoric associated
with freedom of choice for individuals, democratic institutions, and a private enterprise
economy.” (Campbell 1992, 272.)
9 A definition of terrorism, written by UN's terrorism expert A.P. Schmid:
"Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine
individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby — in contrast to
assassination — the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of
violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic
targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication
processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the
main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention,
depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought." (On Terrorism in Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definition_of_terrorism 2006-04-26)
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These considerations serve to reproduce the U.S. practices in the face of contradictory and
threatening interpretations of humanity, most obviously, that of a communal humanity whose
interests are served by social planning and the public ownership of property (which is the
case in Cuba). (Campbell 1992, 272.) But why are these contradictory interpretations of
humanity threatening?
As I already mentioned, Campbell (1990, 265) sees that there exists an important relationship
between foreign policy and the domestic social order. The construction of the U.S. identity is
marked by projecting the differences within the society to the differences between the U.S.
and other societies (Campbell 1990, 271). According to Shapiro these identity stories are
typically trying to hide the historical breaks and changes, the inner multiplicity, the
flexibility of outer boundaries and the similarities between us and the people behind the
boundaries. (Kuusisto 1998, 14.) In other words, concentration on the boundaries between us
and others hides the inner complexities of an identity.
Shapiro, in his studies on U.S. foreign policy, introduces the concept of abstract enmity that
seems to be intrinsic in the foreign policy rhetoric: “For the contemporary United States, for
example, the geopolitical world at any given moment is divided into friends and potential
foes. Danger is expected more from some quarters than others. And the decision to
commence hostilities is based on national (and sometimes international) deliberations.”
(Shapiro 1992, 456.) But where does this enmity derive from?
Shapiro (1992, 469) continues that as the United States attempts to re-establish its damaged
collective subjectivity as an effective and “virile male entity”, “an Enemy” is in part a
product of this process. “In the case of the United States, the damaged collective subjectivity
(often called the 'Vietnam syndrome') is a result of the lost war in the recent past” (Shapiro
1992, 469). Now that Saddam Hussein— the archenemy of the U.S.— is finally removed from
power, the national desire wants to reproduce “him” in order to work on its damaged
15
collective subjectivity. And who could possibly be better than the leader of one of the few
communist states still existing?
So we should ask what the role of fear is in international politics. Is the fear rational and
proportionate or is it rather possible or even over exaggerated? Shapiro (1996, 477-478) has
answered to this question in a following way:
“Denial of disorder within the order for the collective body as a whole should lead to an
intolerance of an external order that fails to validate, by imitation, the domestic order.
Thus a nonimitative order will be interpreted as disordered and, accordingly, as a threat.
Moreover, the 'threat' is dissimulated because of the misrecognition involved in the
very constitution of the self, a failure to recognize dimensions of incoherence and
otherness within the self. Accordingly, the threat is treated as a danger to the general
survival of the order rather than as an affront to the order’s interpretive coherence.”
3. The Relationship between the United States and Cuba— Foes Forever?
"For a revolution to break out it is not enough for the 'lower classes to refuse' to live in the
old way; it is necessary also that the 'upper classes should be unable' to live in the old way."
— Lenin
This chapter is not intended to be an inclusive account on the U.S.— Cuba relations until
today. Rather its purpose is to highlight those events in Cuba's history and those relations
between the United States and Cuba that led to the development of the U.S. perception of
Cuba as a threat.10
10 Jorge I. Dominguez has in a similar way, but in reverse order, divided the political history of Cuba to three
parts: (1) From the U.S. occupation in Cuba until the coup d’état by Batista, (2.) from the coup until the escape
of Batista, and (3.) from the establishment of the 1959 revolution during the 1960 until today (Domínguez 1978,
2).
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3.1. The Threat That Used to Be the Apple of the U.S. Eye
The United States11 has always taken Cuba12 into consideration. Firstly, because of its close
proximity to the U.S.13 Geographically Cuba has a very strategic location. It has been
considered that the country controlling Cuba controls the Gulf of Mexico. Therefore, not
only the U.S. has been interested in it but also Spain, Britain, France and Soviet Union have
wanted to control it. (Rabe 2006.)
The 4th of July 1776 the United States gained its independence from Great Britain. In
1801-09 Thomas Jefferson was convinced that the entire Western Hemisphere would
eventually be part of the United States. Who could want to resist the expansion of liberty?
Cuba was also considered as a “ripe apple” that would fall on the hands of the U.S. when the
time would be right. John Quincy Adams continued the same policy on Cuba in 1823.
Monroe doctrine the same year was also an example of this policy. According to it no
European power should contemplate on taking Cuba because it belongs to the U.S. (Rabe
2006.) At this point Cuba was not portrayed as a threat; the threat was that some European
power might try to take Cuba away from the U.S.
In the Ostend manifesto (1854) Southern slaveholders demanded the annexation of Cuba to
the U.S. However, the U.S. could not annex another slave state to it; instead it had to wait for
the Cuban independence. In Cuba the struggle for independence started in 1868 and lasted
for ten years. The result was the abolishing of slavery in Cuba 1886. The Cuban war for
independence started 1895 and ended in 1898. (Franklin 1997, 5-9.)
11 See on the U.S. for example CIA - The World Factbook (29.03.2006):
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (2006-04-18).
12 See on Cuba for example from Similä, Juhani & Laura (2001), the U.S. Department of State:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2886.htm (2005-12-25), and the European Commission on the EU relations
with Cuba:
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/country/country_home_en.cfm?CID=cu&lng=en&type=h
ome&status=new (2005-09-15).
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The 1880s, when the United States had more or less recovered from the disasters of the civil
war, was a time of rapid economical and geographical expansion. Foreign capital was
flowing to the country and the population was increasing quickly. In the 1880s the United
States shifted from agriculture to heavy industry, commerce and banking. It was the golden
time of democracy and capitalism, where the motto was “each man for himself” and the
principle was “the survival of the fittest.” The “natural” expansion was also directed towards
the South but the expansionism towards Cuba was still patient. This strategically and
economically valuable island would be annexed by the United States when the time would be
ripe. (Siltala 1992, 24-25.)
After the 300 years of Spanish occupation in Cuba the United States finally gained the
control of the island on December 10th 1898 as a conclusion of the war with Spain (that
ended on August 12th 1898). Cuba was the last colony of Spain and therefore the battle was
fierce. With the Teller Amendment, however, the U.S. Senate rejected annexation of Cuba.
President Nixon— as a typical idealist American— wanted Cuba to join the U.S. freely.
(Franklin 1997, 9; Rabe 2006.)
In 1901 the United States got the right to intervene in Cuban affairs by the attachment of the
Platt Amendment14 to the Cuban Constitution. It also received Guantánamo Bay as a naval
station to guard the Gulf of Mexico. On May 20th in 1902 Cuba gained its formal
independence from the United States with Platt Amendment restrictions on its sovereignty.
However, the United States intervened in Cuba in 1906-09, 1912 and again in 1917-22.
(Huberman & Sweezy 1971, 167; Farber 1976, xvii.)
13 Cuba is situated 90 miles South of Florida. CIA - The World Factbook (29.03.2006):
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html (2006-04-18).
14 Platt Amendment gave the U.S. the right to intervene in the Cuban affairs when its national interests were
threatened (Gonzalez 1998, 4).
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3.2. From Independence to the Revolution— U.S. Ambassadors and Cuban Dictators
The Reciprocity treaty between the United States and Cuba was signed in 1903 and lasted
until the 1960. It guaranteed a sugar quota for Cuba in return for free entry of U.S. goods.
This one-crop economy was supposed to tie the Cuban economy to the U.S. Even though
Cuba was prosperous in respect to Latin America in general through 1926-1950, one-crop
economy is never recommendable as the terms of trade will definitely work against it at some
point. For the U.S., however, it was beneficial and investing in Cuba was safe because, in
case of irregularities in Cuba, they could always intervene thanks to the Platt Amendment.
(Rabe 2006.)
The U.S. Ambassadors played a significant role in the politics of Cuba before the Revolution
in 1959 (Scheer & Zeitlin 1964, 34). For example, in 1933 United States Ambassador
Benjamin Sumner Welles mediated between the Machado dictatorship and part of the
opposition, which resulted in Machado abandoning power on the August 12th.
On September 4th, 1933 Sergeant Fulgencio Batista Zaldívar (1901-1973) led the
“Sergeants’ Revolt” supported by the civilian revolutionaries and became the head of Cuba.
In 1934 Batista removed the nationalist government of Ramón Grau San Martín created the
previous year. At the time, the Platt Amendment was officially abolished but the United
States continued to retain a naval base in Guantánamo Bay. (Farber 1976, xvii-xviii, 20-21.)
Batista controlled Cuba through puppet governments during 1934-40 until the New Cuban
Constitution was established and Batista’s rule shifted to a constitutional presidency. At the
time, Batista established his relationship with the Havana mafia. (Farber 1976, xviii.)
In 1944 Batista was forbidden by law to seek re-election by term limits and was succeeded by
Ramón Grau San Martín (the president of Cuba in 1944-48). Batista retired voluntarily to
Florida but returned in 1952 by organizing a coup d'état to remove Carlos Prío Socarrás
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(elected in 1948) from power. Batista became president three months before new elections
were to be held. The new government received diplomatic recognition from the United States
and the island became a major tourist destination, which increased the prosperity on the
island. In the beginning, the Cuban public somehow accepted the coup as well, hoping that
Batista would restore stability on the island after the political violence, labour unrest and
government corruption that had occurred during Prío's regime. (Farber 1976, xviii; Conzalez
1998, 5-6.)
Despite the economic prosperity in the 1950s, the regular Cubans lived in poverty without
education and health care. Batista's corruption, particularly his unsettlingly close relationship
with the Havana mafia, saw a rise in general opposition to his violent regime. Fidel Castro
was one of the opponents of this regime. Castro attempted first to challenge Batista's
takeover judicially but his petition was refused. He was imprisoned after leading an attack
against Batista on the Moncada Barracks in July, 1953. This attack started a broader
revolutionary movement against Batista. However, in 1955, Batista released Castro who
went into exile in Mexico and the United States. (Farber 1976, xviii, 46-47; Conzalez 1998,
6-9.)
In May 1956, Castro returned to Cuba to fight for the revolution. In response to a failed
assault on the presidential palace in 1957, by other resistance groups unaffiliated with Castro,
Batista launched a major assault against Castro and the other rebel groups. During this period
of violence, restrictions of constitutional rights and media censorship, the U.S. broke off
relations with Batista, stating that it sought a peaceful transition to a new government.
(Castro 1978, 29; Kuuba valloittaa –elokuva ja kuubalaisen kulttuurin esittelylehti [“Cuba
Conquers/Entices”, a film and a magazine on Cuban culture] 2004, 4.)
In the end of 1958 Che Guevara led the revolutionary troops to victory in the city of Santa
Clara. This ended the dictatorship of Batista in Cuba for good and started to decrease the
power of the U.S. in Cuba as well. It took for long for the U.S. to realize that Cuba was not
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interested to join it freely. However, as this became clear, the U.S. started to construct the
image of Cuba as a threat.
3.3. The U.S.— Cuba Relations from 1959 to the Present
Dr. Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz (born in 1926) has ruled Cuba since the beginning of 1959,
when he overthrew the regime of Fulgencio Batista, and transformed Cuba into the first
communist state in the Western hemisphere. This was the beginning for Cuba to be perceived
as a threat to the Americans.
Castro first attracted attention in Cuban political life through his student activism; his
outspoken nationalism and radical critique of Batista and the U.S. corporate and political
influence in Cuba brought a receptive following criticism, and attention from the authorities.
Since his ascension to power in 1959 Castro has become only more controversial and
high-profile, inciting both condemnation and adulation, and in general, debate. (Thomas
1971, 809-823, 835-844, 1038-1090.)
Right after his ascension to power Castro visited the United States. He did it to show that he
is different from the previous rulers of Cuba. He wanted to show that Cuba no longer needs
the U.S. It is an independent country that will become self-sustaining. (Rabe 2006.) This
increased the unrest in the U.S. who had been used to control Latin America with economical
arrangements.
“The  revolution  was  waged  against  the  system of  power  which  had  existed  for  six
decades. Given the role of the United States in that power structure, the revolution
inevitably led to conflict between Cuba and the United States. ... For not only did
United States economic interests play a strategic role, but also Cuban governmental
affairs were largely under United States control.” (Scheer & Zeitlin 1964, 16, 33.)
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Ernesto Rafael Guevara de la Serna (1928-1967), commonly known as Che Guevara or el
Che15, was an Argentinean-born doctor who became a Marxist revolutionary and Cuban
guerrilla leader. Guevara led the 26th of July Movement that seized power in Cuba in 1959
with Castro whom he had met in Mexico City. Che served in various important posts in the
new Cuban government such as the President of the National Bank of Cuba and Minister of
Industries. Guevara left Cuba in 1965 to evoke revolutions in other countries, and eventually
died as a combatant in Bolivia in 1967. (Castro 1972, 246-251.)
Cuba was proclaimed socialist in 1961 largely thanks to Che (maybe Castro would have
chosen a more democratic and capitalistic government by himself). Che's premise was the
development of people and his goal was to provide everybody a life reflecting human dignity.
In the development of society the main concern had to be Man (and not for example some
political groups or economic growth), but the society was supposed to create an efficient
governance to decrease egoism (false individualism). According to Che the development of
society is valuable only if it increases the feeling of solidarity, enables people to be creative
and serves the individual development. (Anderson 2004; Kuuba valloittaa –elokuva ja
kuubalaisen kulttuurin esittelylehti [“Cuba Conquers/Entices”, a film and a magazine on
Cuban culture] 2004, 4-5.; Krook 2005, http://che.playagiron.net/ 2005-11-24.)
Very different societal structures after the Revolution in Cuba in 1959 have caused a rupture
in the economical relationship of the respective countries. The U.S. is a constitution-based
federal republic which has a strong democratic tradition, whereas, President Castro's Cuba
has a one-party system where the Communist Party of Cuba holds the monopoly of political
power.
15 Che is a Spanish interjection used commonly in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, some parts of Bolivia, Costa
Rica, and also in Valencia, Spain. It is an exclamation, often used to get attention or express surprise. It is also
used in a vocative sense as though it meant "friend". In other Latin American countries, the term Che is used to
refer to someone from Argentina. For example, Ernesto "Che" Guevara earned his nickname from his frequent
use of this expression. Wikipedia (2005): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Che (2005-11-23) - See Mannila (2005)
about the use of Wikipedia as a reference:
http://www.digitoday.fi/showPage.php?page_id=11&news_id=51343 (2005-12-20).
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In May 1959 the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted. The following year Castro achieved a
complete control of Cuban press and mass media. From June to July 1960 United
States-owned oil companies refused to process Russian oil and were then appropriated by the
Cuban government. Eisenhower abrogated Cuban sugar quota. In August 1960 a large-scale
appropriation of United States-owned property in Cuba was undertaken by Castro. Finally, in
October 1960 a full-scale United States economic blockade of Cuba began, and a large-scale
appropriation of property owned by Cuban capitalists was undertaken. (Conzalez 1998,
10-13; Farber 1976, xviii-xix;Siltala 2000, 26.)
During the Clinton administration the economic blockade became stricter by introducing the
Torricelli and Helms-Burton laws. Clinton signed the Cuban Democracy Act (Torricelli Law)
in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, better known as the
Helms-Burton Act in 199616 . Control of the economy— codified in the Helms-Burton
Act— is  supposed  to  be  reverted  back  to  private  hands  (mostly  the  U.S.  citizens  and
corporations). The Helms-Burton Act also made the blockade permanent in the American
Constitution, which means that only the complete change of regime (including the removal
of Fidel and Raúl Castro) can dissolve the blockade. (Siltala 2000, 27.)
Internationally, Castro’s leadership has been marked by tension with the United States
(culminating in the Cuban Missile Crisis17) and a close partnership with the Soviet Union18.
Domestically, he has overseen the implementation of radical land reform followed by the
collectivisation of agriculture, nationalization of leading Cuban industries and social
16 Legislative information from Thomas - The Library of Congress (2005):
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/bills_res.html (2005-12-25).
17 The Soviet Union had a naval base in Cuba. In the October 1962 J.F. Kennedy declared that Cuba would be
surrounded until the Soviet missiles have been taken away from Cuba. (Conzalez 1998, 14.)
18 I attended an open discussion on the controversial personality of Fidel Castro in October 2005 at the
University of Helsinki. See e.g. Sirén (17.10.2005) http://www.kuubaseura.fià Cuba SíàYhteiskunta &
Politiikkaà Fidel puhutti Helsingin yliopistolla (2005-12-21).
23
programs that instituted universal healthcare and expanded public education. Castro's
government initially won widespread support among Cubans but alienated many as the new
government nationalized industries, suppressed all opposition parties and restricted
emigration. (Thomas 1971, 1483-1494.)
In the event of sickness or death, Vice President Raúl Castro, who is Fidel Castro’s brother,
will legally assume the leadership post. As I mentioned earlier, this should not change the
relationship between the United States and Cuba due to legislation that is connected to Castro
brothers (Siltala 2000, 27). However, the attempt of the U.S. clearly stated in the Report is to
prevent the transition of power from Fidel to Raúl. In the following analysis, I will examine
more closely the role of this transition as a threat.
4. The Research Material and Tools for Analysing the Report
“Our government will establish a Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba, to plan for
the happy day when Castro's regime is no more and democracy comes to the island.”
— George W. Bush
I find it important to analyse the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba –Report for a few
reasons (the main reasons I already presented in the Introduction). One is that it is a fairly
recent report and sociologists are to concentrate mainly on the current societal issues19.
Furthermore, I suggest that this is a suitable place for a sociological intervention.
19 Sulkunen (1998, 20) believes that this is the common feature of all the sociological point of views. They all
concentrate on explaining and interpreting the current societal phenomena without neglecting the historical
consciousness.
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Alain Touraine (1981, 27), has been using the sociological intervention in his studies on
social movements. The aim of the method is to analyse the structure and features of the
informal thinking (in contrast to the scientific thinking). In other words, it means intervening
in the functions of a society by analysing the concepts used by the parties involved in a
conflict. Normally people involved are either too much or too little aware of their actions
(Sulkunen 1998, 17.) As Touraine (1981, 27) believes a researcher can be an intermediary
between parties involved (to this theme I will come back in the Conclusions).
In general, people do not consider reports like these very interesting to them if they do not
belong to one of the parties involved. The consequence of this is that both of the parties
involved might miss something that would be valuable to the core issue in question. The
sociological intervention, that is critical and systematic, is of great importance in this case
because there is no fruitful dialogue going on between the countries (Siltala 2000, 29).
4.1. About the Report as the Research Material
George W. Bush, the President of the United States, established the Commission for the
Assistance to a Free Cuba in 2003. By May 2004 the Commission published the Report that I
use as the research material for my thesis. The aim of this report is to “hasten Cuba's peaceful
transition to a representative democracy and a free market economy— ending decades of an
oppressive dictatorship.20”
The Commission consists of representatives from a variety of different state departments
such as the Treasury, Defence, Justice, Agriculture and Environmental Protection Agency.
What has been debated about is the assembly of the Commission that is openly against the
20 The Fact Sheet on Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in the WebPages of the U.S. Department of
State (8.12.2003): http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/26976.htm (2005-11-03).
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Castro regime. It includes anti-Castro hardliners21 such as Otto Reich, Roger Noriega, Jose
Cardenas, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Diaz-Balart22.
The report is 458 pages long and addresses different aspects of societal change. Chapter 123
deals with hastening Cuba's transition by empowering Cuban civil society, breaking the
information blockade, denying revenues to the Castro regime, illuminating the reality of
Castro's Cuba and encouraging international diplomatic efforts to support Cuban civil
society. Furthermore, it challenges the Castro regime by undermining the regime's
succession strategy. I see these as the objects of the stories in the Greimasian sense that I
further examine in Chapter 5.
”What follows in Chapters 2 through 6 is a survey of the areas in which the U.S.
Government can assist a free Cuba in all facets of its reconstruction and renewal. This
document proposes a wide range of actions that the U.S. Government might propose to a
Cuban transition government. They are not intended to be a prescription for Cuba's
future.” (Report, 2.)
Chapter 2 tackles with meeting basic human needs in the areas of health, education, housing,
and human services. Chapter 3 takes into consideration questions about establishing
democratic institutions, respecting human rights, rule of law and national justice and
reconciliation. Chapter 4 moves on to discuss establishing the core institutions of a free
economy. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the modernization of the Cuban infrastructure. Last, in
21 See some information on these controversial figures at the website of the Cuba Solidarity Project (1997-2005):
http://vdedaj.club.fr/cuba/garde_noire_bush.html#reich (2005-12-25).
22 Read about the Congress representatives e.g. Diaz-Balart (2006):
http://diaz-balart.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=Home.Home; Ros-Lehtinen (2006):
http://www.house.gov/ros-lehtinen/biography.shtml; critical portraits: http://www.kominf.pp.fi/L1extra.html
(2005-12-25).
23 As I refer to the Report, the chapters are marked in italics (distinguishing them from the chapters of this
thesis).
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Chapter 6, the issue of environmental degradation is addressed.
Chapter 1 is the longest (52 pages) and describes the transition of Cuba broadly, whereas the
other chapters concentrate mainly on one particular topic. The first chapter deals with the
most current and fundamental issues, such as how to make the Castro regime fall, whereas
the other chapters concentrate more on the situation after Castro and his government have
been removed from power. These are the reasons why I concentrate on Chapter 1.
The basis for the Report is highly value-oriented even though it seems like the values are not
justified in any ways. It espouses noble causes but not the ideology behind it. It does not even
clearly define its audience. I want to find out if it is a “happy” day— and to whom— when
Fidel Castro passes away, as President Bush put it in October 200324: “Our government will
establish a Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba, to plan for the happy day when
Castro's regime is no more and democracy comes to the island.”
When I analyse the Report and threats presented in it, in Chapter 5 and 6, I refer to it— as
mentioned earlier— as “Report” with the page number of the quotation. As mentioned in the
Introduction, the whole report can be found from the WebPages of the U.S. Department of
State25.
4.2. Textual Analysis as the “Research Method”
The sociological interpretation is supposed to uncover facets of reality otherwise left
unnoticed. Pekka Sulkunen (1997, 21) says that this is achieved with the help of theory— a
theory about the intelligibility of the reality and a historical background theory about the
24 The Fact Sheet on Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba in the WebPages of the White House
(8.12.2003): http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031208-8.html  (2006-01-01).
25 The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba –report is found in the WebPages of the U.S. government
(2004): http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/c12237.htm (2005-10-26).
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society in question. In this paper, I have already introduced a theory about the U.S. foreign
policy. In this chapter I present a theory of the intelligibility of the reality that is based on
social constructivism. According to social constructivism the meanings given to social
phenomena are constantly produced and interpreted in discourses. Due to this “process
nature” of reality, it is better to talk about understanding and producing reality rather than the
meanings of reality per se.  (Sulkunen 1997, 16-17.)
I started analysing the Report by using the grounded theory developed by Strauss and Corbin
(1998) but grew to prefer a more concrete theory of the semiotic sociology26. However, the
grounded theory helped me to structure the research material so that I was able see what kind
of tools would be the most helpful ones in relation to my research question. As Sulkunen
(1997, 35) states, interpretative sociology requires theory about structures that enables the
reality to be dealt with as texts. Firstly, this theory derived from textual analysis makes it
possible avoid projecting the contradictions of the researcher’s life to the research material.
Secondly, it prevents the researcher simplifying the reality presented in the material to his or
her sociological theories. (Törrönen 1999, 28-30.)
The theory about intelligibility I use in this analysis to discover the threats presented in the
Report is achieved by combining three ways of examining textual structures: the rhetorical
analysis and the pending narrative I use to reveal how the threats are presented in the Report,
whereas the semiotics of stories I use to discover as a what kind of threat the Cuba is
presented in it. All of these textual analyses stress that, as one makes reality comprehensible,
one automatically produces values to it. Furthermore, they agree that when making reality
understandable,  one does it  from a certain perspective;  a  “narrator” is  telling a  story to  a
26 One reason for this was that the Grounded Theory has been criticized for the undermining of theory in
research. “In arguing that grounded theory inductively emerges from data, Glaser and Strauss have been
criticized on the grounds that they advocate a ‘Baconian’ inductivism. On this interpretation, grounded theory is
depicted as a tabula rasa view of inquiry which indefensibly maintains that observations are not theory or
concept dependent.” Haig (1995) http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/EPS/PES-yearbook/95_docs/haig.html
(2006-01-01).
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certain “audience” in the text.
I chose these three semiotic tools of sociological analysis (that I will next present you)
because I believe they reinforce each other in a very beneficial way regarding my research
question that examines the logic and values of the United States in its foreign policy directed
towards Cuba. After analysing the narratives in the first chapter of the Commission to
Assistance to a Free Cuba –Report with the actantial model of Greimas in Chapter 5, I move
on to the analysis of the argumentation with the tools derived from Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca in Chapter 6. Lastly, before moving to the conclusion, I study how the
Report uses the pending narrative of Törrönen to persuade the audience to act.
4.2.1. Sociosemiotic Analysis with A.J. Greimas
As said, creating threats is an integral part of the foreign policy. As I look at the Report from
the point of view of Greimas’ semiotic sociology, I will be able to get a broader view on the
threats presented. The actantial model shows how the threats are linked to different actantial
positions in the Report. By finding out how the threat is constructed through different
actantial positions, the analysis becomes more multidimensional, for example by showing
the links between values and actantial positions.
The concepts developed by Algirdas Julien Greimas (1917-1991) create a theory of
structures that enables reality to be dealt with as texts— provided that semiotics is namely
understood as a theory of textual structures leaving out the metaphysical presumptions or
objectives (Sulkunen 1998, 163). Greimas started off as a linguist and a researcher of
lexicology before he moved to semantics (Greimas 1999, 4). He developed his famous
formal semiotic model called the actantial model after having familiarized himself with the
work of Vladimir Propp that dealt with the morphology of a folktale (See Figure 1. [Törrönen
1999, 158]).
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Sender Object Receiver
Anti-Subject
Helper Subject                                       Opponent
                               Figure 1. The Actantial Model.
The actantial model enables me to analyse how the modal identity for the subject to take
action is constructed through actantial positions. The four modalities that construct the
identity are provided for the subject to ensure success in action. They provide the legitimacy
(obligation) and direction (will) for the action and also indicate what kinds of means (abilities
and competencies) are needed to achieve the goal and to what kind of obstacles one has to be
prepared for. (Törrönen 2000, 85-86.)
The actantial model also helps me to see who is urging the subject to act in face of the threat
and how this affects the subject’s action. “The relation between the sender and the subject
expresses  the ‘having to  do’ (obligation)  of  the action.  It  makes a  difference whether  the
action is legitimated by the name of God or by the name of personal revenge (Törrönen 2000,
85).”
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The relationship between the subject and the object shows what kind of ‘wanting to do’ (will)
is the motor for the action. It is useful to look at the relationship of the subject and the object
in order to find out what exactly provides the cultural legitimacy for the will, or what
unconscious motive drives it toward its object. The object, then, will reveal what kinds of
goals are regarded as important. (Törrönen 2000, 85.)
The helpers embody the kind of ‘abilities’ (being able to do) and ‘competencies’ (knowing
how to do) that are considered worthwhile or necessary in hindering the threats that has been
created by the anti-subject. Anti-subjects and opponents illustrate the kind of resistance that
the subject has to overcome in order to achieve the ultimate goal— the removal of the threats.
At the same time, they convey to the audience what kind of means are considered inferior or
forbidden in the pursuit of the goals. They also draw the boundary between us (good people)
and others (bad people). (Törrönen 2000, 85-86.)
In the next chapter (Chapter 5) I make the story structures apparent with the help of actantial
model. I use the model as a logical tool for my analysis because it helps me to find out the
different actantial positions of the Report and how they are linked to the threats presented.
The sender is the one who has seen the threats. Subject is fighting— together with the helper
of the subject— against the threats. The object is to prevent the threats from becoming reality,
so that the receivers would be able to live in a more secure and just world. Anti-subject is the
one who causes the threats and opponent is helping the anti-subject in its task.
4.2.2. Argumentation Analysis as a Device to Discoveries
Chaïm Perelman (1912-1984), a Belgian professor of philosophy and jurisprudence, belongs
to the school of the new rhetoric (together with Kenneth Burke and Stephen Toulmin).
According to them, the task of rhetoric is to persuade the audience to accept certain
theses—that are believable, or likely but not self-evident—in a certain situation (Kuusisto,
1998, 24). So, it is the research of logic and convincing that the new rhetoric deals with.
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In the The New Rhetoric. A Treatise on Argumentation, Perelman27, with his secretary and
collaborator Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, sought to construct a theory of argumentation by
analysing the methods of proof used in the human sciences, law and philosophy. In their
treatise they examined arguments put forward for example by politicians in speeches,
lawyers in pleadings and judges in decisions (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 10). The
object of this “theory of argumentation is the study of the discursive techniques allowing us
to induce or to increase the mind's adherence to the theses presented for its assent” (Italics in
the original text, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 4). I believe, therefore, that their theory,
and the method derived from it, is very suitable for my study.28
It is a “theory of argumentation which, with the aid of discourse, aims at securing an efficient
action on minds” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 9). Therefore, I study how the U.S.
report intends to increase the readers’ adherence of minds to their standpoint. How is the U.S.
persuading the audience to accept the existence of threats that Cuba poses?
According to Perelman’s rhetoric the main thing in argumentation is to take into
consideration the context in which the text is presented. Understanding cultural values of the
audience in question is highly important. The audience—as understood for the purposes of
rhetoric—is “the ensemble of those whom the speaker wishes to influence by his
argumentation” (Italics in the original text, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 19).
In  Chapter  6,  I  first  analyse,  in  compliance  with  Perelman’s  study,  the  premises  of
argumentation presented in the Report. Understanding the strength or the weakness of the
premises is of great importance when analysing the over-all validity of the argumentation.
27 Read Oliveira (6.7.1999) about Perelman: http://www.vusst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/perelman.htm
(2005-11-30).
28 The new rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca is more suitable for the analysis of this study, compared
to the theories of Aristotle in the Rhetoric—even if they belong to the same tradition of rhetoric—because it is
especially aimed at studying the written argumentation, whereas the teachings of Aristotle concentrate on the
spoken argumentation.
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Successful argumentation analysis is not based only on analysing the different argumentation
techniques but on analysing the different strategies of language used to shift the consensus
achieved on the premises to the controversial conclusions as well.
As I already mentioned, the domain of argumentation is that of the credible, the plausible,
and the probable. According to Perelman, it is the idea of self-evidence as characteristic of
reason29, which we must abandon, if we want to make place for a theory of argumentation
that will acknowledge the use of reason in directing our own actions and influencing those of
others.  Pascal  was  of  the  opinion  that  if  self-evidence  is  considered  the  characteristic  of
reason, all proof would reduce to the self-evident, and what is self-evident would have no
need of proof. However, the logical theory of demonstration— that is the basis for the new
rhetoric— was developed following Leibniz. According to Leibniz even the self-evident
needs proofs. (Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca 1971, 2-3.) In other words, even if it would
seem self-evident for Americans that Cuba is a threat, they still have to demonstrate it in their
argumentation.
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 65-99) divide the premises— objects of
agreement— into two classes: the first group consists of the real, comprising facts, truths and
presumptions; the second group concerns the preferable, comprising values and hierarchies.
In Chapter 6, after I have analysed the premises of the Report, I will further analyse the U.S.
argumentation by looking at the actual argumentation techniques derived from Perelman.
29 The idea of self-evidence as characteristic of reason is the result of the Cartesian rational science that has left
its mark on the modern science for the last three centuries. René Descartes considered rational only those
demonstrations which started from clear and disctinct ideas (self-evident axioms) and were extended by means
of apodictic proofs and deducted to the logical theorems. According to Cartesian rational science, a
disagreement is, therefore, a sign of error. (Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca 1971, 1-2.)
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Motivating with the Pending Narrative
A researcher Jukka Törrönen has found an important macrostructure of persuasive speech by
studying semiotics. He calls this rhetorical form the pending narrative. “With it the speaker
not only describes the world and its social phenomena but also lays a foundation for
transforming the world to conform to the objective imposed in the narrative” (Törrönen 1999,
153).
As I analyse the Report in the next chapter, we shall see how the U.S. is using the pending
narrative to inspire the audiences toward specific goals of action. Therefore, it facilitates the
understanding of "how" the argumentation aids the fulfilment of the U.S. interests.
Narratives are an integral part of human lives. As Robert Atkinson30 (2002) puts it: “we are
the storytelling species”. Törrönen (2000, 82) continues that we compose narratives in order
to make sense of our own life, to interpret other lives, to explain social and political events, as
well as to map the possible routes of the coming day. Narratologists have defined narrative as
involving at least two events (neither of which presupposes or entails the other logically).
Narratives, therefore, have a beginning, middle and an end. The middle explains the change
from the beginning to end.
Greimas has proposed, with his model of the canonical narrative schema (developed from the
studies of Vladimir Propp and Claude Lévi-Strauss) that an ideal narrative is composed of the
three mini-narratives: the qualifying test, the decisive test and the sanctifying test (Greimas
& Courtés 1982: 203-206). According to this model, each test has its own specific function
within the narrative: the qualifying test builds up the subject’s motivation to act, the principal
test actualizes the action, and the sanctifying test aims at evaluating the action.
30 Robert Atkinson, Ph.D. (University of Pennsylvania), founded the Center for the Study of Lives in 1988. His
doctoral training is in cross-cultural human development, and he has master's degrees in both folk culture and
counseling. His primary interests are in the narrative study of lives, the methodology and interpretation of the
life story interview, and cultural influences on life span development.
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Greimas’ canonical narrative schema explains the functioning of the pending narrative. As
the motivation for the action has been created, in other words, when the qualifying test has
been fulfilled (Greimas & Courtés 1982: 203-206), the story is interrupted. The other two
tests, the decisive test and the sanctifying test, never occur. Their accomplishment is
transferred to the responsibility of the audience. As said, the pending narrative aims at
motivating the audience to take action. “This motivation involves two parts, a contract part
and a qualification part. The contract part establishes an agreement between the sender and
the subject to eliminate the anti-subject and to bring about a new equilibrium” (Törrönen
2000, 83).
However, it also constructs for the narrator and the audience specific actantial positions in
relation to the action set forward. The pending narrative operates then in the dimension of the
represented action, which Greimas calls “utterance” and in the dimension of interaction
between the narrator and the audience, “enunciation”. (Törrönen 1999, 155.)
I believe that the pending narrative finalizes the U.S. argumentation of Cuba as a threat. The
reason for the need of the Report is made apparent by interrupting the story after presenting
several threats.
5. The Threats Apparent in the Actantial Models
"Social identity lies in difference, and difference is asserted against what is closest, which
represents the greatest threat."— Pierre Bourdieu.
The text in Chapter 1 is possible to arrange into six main actantial models (See the
Attachment 1, Tables III-VIII). In addition to the Chapter 1 I  have  also  arranged  the
executive summary and introduction to the actantial models (See Attachment 1: Table I and
II). All models share many similarities. In five of the actantial models (actantial models
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2-6)— as well as in the summary and the introduction— the sender is the United States.
Sender is the actor who has realised the threat(s). In one of them the sender could be seen
either as the United States or Cubans (actantial model 2), and in one of the actantial models
(actantial model 1) the senders are the Cuban dissidents:
“Now, the tide of public opinion has turned and Castro's loyalists must constantly work
to restrain the Cuban people from organizing and expressing demands for change and
freedom. Cubans are increasingly losing their fear and vocalizing their desire to be
architects of their own destinies. Examples of this include the efforts of such brave
dissidents as Raul Rivero, Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet, Martha Beatriz Roque, and Oswaldo
Paya.” (Italics added, Report, 16.)
The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs are the subjects in most of the stories (actantial
models 2-6 and the summary). Subjects are the actors fighting against the threat(s). In two of
them (in the introduction and the actantial model 1), however, the subject is the Cuban
people.
Furthermore, the Cuban people are pictured as the receivers in all of the actantial models.
Receivers are those who should be able to live without threats shadowing their lives.
“Recognizing the humanitarian need in Cuba as a basis for U.S. policies on remittances, gift
parcels, and family travel, the Commission recommends a tightening of current policies to
decrease the flow of resources to the regime” (Italics added, Report, 39).
Receivers throughout the whole Report are implicitly also the Americans and other people in
the Western Hemisphere who would suffer after the Cubans if the U.S. government will not
be able to stop the Castro regime of functioning: “The Castro regime continues to be a threat
not only to its own people, but also to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and
market economies in the Western Hemisphere, and the people of the United States” (Italics
added, Report, 12).
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It is the prevention of the threats becoming reality that differs the most. In other words, there
are many different objects in the actantial models. In the summary and the introduction the
core of the object (that is told in the introduction) is the same: to free Cuban people from
Castro’s repressive rule. It is enlarged in the summary by adding to its object a peaceful
transition to a representative democracy and a free market economy that will result in the
improvement of the living standards of the Cuban people.
In the first of the actual actantial models, the object is to find ways to empower Cuban civil
society and strengthen the democratic opposition through material assistance and training. In
the second actantial model the object is to break the information blockade by, for example,
building on the work already underway by the U.S. Government broadcasting entities. In the
third one the object is to deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship, by undermining the
regime-sustaining tourism and by limiting the regime’s manipulation of humanitarian U.S.
policies, among other measures. In the fourth story the object is to illuminate the reality of
Castro’s Cuba, including its threat potential. In the fifth model the object is to encourage
international efforts to support Cuban civil society and challenge the Castro regime. In the
last actantial model the object is the most important of them all: to undermine the regime’s
“succession strategy” 31 by supporting a democratic transition. This object is implicitly added
to the objects of the other stories as well.
“U.S. policy must be targeted at undermining this succession strategy by stripping
away layers of support within the regime, creating uncertainty regarding the political
and legal future of those in leadership positions, and encouraging more of those within
the ruling elite to shift their allegiance to those pro-democracy forces working for a
transition to a free and democratic Cuba.” (Italics added, Report, 51.)
Anti-subject—the one who causes the threat(s)—in all of the stories is the Castro regime, and
in one of them (actantial model 2) it is the Cuban Communist Party (CCP), in particular. The
31 “The Regime’s survival strategy is to maintain the core elements of the existing political structure in passing
eventual leadership of the country from Fidel to Raul Castro and others currently in the senior leadership”
Report, 51).
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opponent aka helper of the anti-subject is mentioned only in one of the actantial models
(actantial model 3); in the third story and in the summary (and more vaguely in the
introduction too) the helper of the one who causes the threat(s) is mainly the government of
Hugo Chavéz, and other countries, organizations and people who support the Castro regime
economically. “Cheap Venezuelan oil is vital to keeping the Cuban economy functioning,
generates additional hard currency, and enables Cuba to postpone much needed economic
reforms (Report, 43).”
This may be deliberate; the U.S. may want to create an impression that the Castro’s Regime
does not have any friends, which makes the supporting of the efforts of the United States
even easier. Or then, that Cuba no longer has any significant allies, as it used to have the
Soviet Union.
The helpers of the subject— the actors possessing the competencies and capacities needed to
assist the subject to prevent the threat(s) from becoming reality— are the U.S. government,
agencies and NGOs, third countries, and the third-country organizations, religious and
faith-based groups (actantial model 1); Cubans and third-countries (actantial model 2);
Western world (including internationals actors such as the European Union) and the civil
society in Cuba (actantial models of the introduction and the summary, actantial models 3-6).
“Examples of the types of projects that willing third-countries and NGOs could engage
in include: technical training and material assistance to the Independent Libraries
Project; outreach initiatives on labor rights in Cuba; technical training for independent
unions provided by willing third-country trade unionists; publicly available Internet
access facilities in diplomatic missions in Cuba, which also could be used to distribute
other informational materials related to democracy, the rule of law, and human rights;
direct relationships between willing third-country governments and independent civil
society and opposition groups; and solidarity visits to the families of political prisoners
by prominent foreign figures.” (Italics added, Report, 46-47.)
On the following page (36) are the different actantial positions in the stories presented in the
Report:
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Actantial Position Actor
Senders
— the actors who has
realised the threat(s)
Subjects
— the actors fighting
against the threat(s)
Objects
— the prevention of the
threat(s) becoming reality
Helpers
— the actors assisting the
subject to prevent the
threat(s)
Anti-Subjects
— the one who causes the
threat(s)
Opponents
— the helper of the one
who causes the threat(s)
Receivers
— the actors receiving a
life without threats
The United States (actantial models 3-6, the summary and the
introduction) / either the Cuban people or the United States
(actantial model 2) / the Cuban dissidents (actantial model 1).
The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs (actantial models 2-6
and the summary) / the Cuban people (the introduction and
actantial model 1).
To free Cuban people from Castro’s repressive rule (actantial
model of the introduction) / a peaceful transition to a
representative democracy and a free market economy that will
result to the improvement of the living standards of the Cuban
people (actantial model of the summary) / empower Cuban civil
society and strengthen the democratic opposition (actantial
model 1) / break the information blockade (actantial model 2) /
deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship (actantial model 3) /
illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba, including its threat
potential (actantial model 4) / encourage international efforts to
support Cuban civil society and challenge the Castro regime
(actantial model 5) / undermine the regime’s “succession
strategy” by supporting a democratic transition (actantial model
6, implicitly in all actantial models).
The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, third countries, and
the third-country organizations, religious and faith-based
groups (actantial model 1) / Cubans and the third countries
(actantial model 2) / Western world (including internationals
actors such as the European Union) and the civil society in Cuba
(introduction, summary and the actantial models 3-6).
The Castro regime (all actantial models) / the Cuban
Communist Party (actantial model 2).
The government of Hugo Chavéz (actantial model 3 and
vaguely in the introduction).
The Cuban people (all actantial models).
Table 1. The Actantial Positions of the Report.
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6. How the Threat Is Created in the Report
"Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba"
"He who does not study rhetoric will be a victim of it"— found on a Greek wall from the 6th
Century B.C.
Not only threats are important in the foreign policy, but also the way they are built. The
rhetorical analysis of Perelman brings into the light the discursive diplomacy of the U.S. and
its logic. By showing the way the Report starts to convince the audience with premises and
moving on to the argumentation techniques, I will be able to analyse how the graveness of the
threats is warranted and what kind of methods are used in order to achieve this. However,
without the pending narrative the values and the logic of the Report would remain
uninteresting facts. The pending narrative ignites the passion from accepting the values— due
to the logical argumentation— to the action by constructing a tension caused by the
developed threats. It reveals the connection of rhetorical convincing and the desired action.
As one analyses the Report one is able to see the different audiences to whom this Report is
directed. The first discourse is supposed to convince the Cubans and the international
community:
 “For more than four decades, Fidel Castro's destructive policies at home and abroad
have caused great hardship for the Cuban people. He has systematically undermined
the democratic principles and fierce national pride of Cuba, destroyed its economy,
subverted his neighbors, and launched bloody military expeditions around the
world. … Cubans continue to be denied fundamental freedoms. They cannot form
independent, alternative political parties outside of the communist party, elect
representatives of their own choosing, form free associations, or freely express
themselves. They are denied recourse to an independent judiciary that could protect
their rights.” (Report, 1-2.)
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“We propose increased efforts to illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba … including
its threat potential… . The Castro regime continues to be a threat not only to its own
people, but also to regional stability, the consolidation of democracy and market
economies in the Western Hemisphere, and the people of the United States. The Castro
regime harbors dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice, including those convicted of
killing law enforcement officials. It aggressively conducts espionage against the
United States, including having operated a spy network, one of whose members was
convicted of conspiring to kill U.S. citizens. The Castro regime also has engaged in
other hostile acts against its neighbors and other democracies in the Hemisphere. On
several occasions, Castro has threatened and orchestrated mass sea-borne migrations to
Florida of tens of thousands of Cubans in an effort to intimidate and harm the United
States.” (Report, 9-10, 12.)
Whereas the second discourse argues in favour of the U.S. government to augmenting the
budget reserved for the Cuban cause and maybe even to change some legislation concerning
the case.
“In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies towards Cuba that were
implemented in isolation from each other. ... The Commission for Assistance to a Free
Cuba sought a more proactive, integrated, and disciplined approach to undermine the
survival strategies of the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the
Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end. The recommendations also focus on
actions available to the United States Government, allowing us to establish a strong
foundation on which to build supportive international efforts.” (Report, 7, 15.)
Often these discourses overlap each other which make them more convincing. The aim of the
Report Commission for  Assistance to  a Free Cuba is to get Cubans and the international
actors to act according to the Report at the right moment, in other words, when Castro will
pass away. To achieve this, the U.S. argumentation has to be efficient. According to
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971, 45)
“an  efficacious  argument  is  one  which  succeeds  in  increasing  the  intensity  of
adherence among those who hear it in such a way as to set in motion the intended action
(a positive action or an abstention from action) or at least in creating in the hearers a
willingness to act which will appear at the right moment”.
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I will now show the efficiency of the argumentation of the Report by examining it here
openly. First, I analyse the basic premises— linked to threats— found from the Report. I will
present them with the help of extracts. Then, I will sum them up in a simple way before I
move on to analyse the argumentation techniques.
I start the analysis of the premises by scrutinising all the facts, truths and presumptions that
the Americans creating this Report have included. All of them are somehow related to the
concept of threat. The threat is used as a catalyst for the audience to act in a desired way.
Then I show what kinds of values are represented and the hierarchy between them. The right
values, we are told, are threatened. The last group of premises for argumentation, that
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1971) present, are the different loci for arguments 32 .
Moreover, because I argue that analysing the loci is irrelevant to the argumentation— it does
not bring out anything new in relation to the research question or the key concepts of this
thesis— I omit their analysis from this study.
6.1. The American Facts, Truths and Presumptions about Cuba as a Threat
The conceptions of the real can vary widely depending on the philosophic views people
profess. However, everything in argumentation that is deemed to relate to the real is aimed at
32 Loci are very general, rules for reasoning— that normally remain implicit. They are considered to help the
speaker to construct his or her arguments and they play a part in the justification of most of the choices he or she
makes. They are things generally considered desirable. According to Perelman, they can be called as
“storehouses for arguments”. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 84.)
Loci of quantity is used when something is valued better according to quantitative reasons. For example the
happiness of the majority of Cubans is more desirable than the happiness of the ruling elite. “[A]ttention and
pressure must be focused on the ruling elite so that succession by this elite or any individual is seen as what it
would be: an impediment to a democratic and free Cuba” (Report, 51). Loci of quality is used when one cannot
appeal to the quantity. Then one appeals to the uniqueness of the cause. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971,
85-93.) As in the case of Cuba, the Report states that this time the dictatorship’s end is closer than before due to
the unique approach of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba undermining “the survival strategies of
the Castro regime and contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end”
(Report, 15).
According to the Loci of order the state of affairs that has existed longer is considered better than the one that
has existed a shorter period of time. In the Report one can read that the freedom is something that has always
existed until the Castro regime came into existence 45 years ago. Therefore it is preferable to achieve the
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the universal audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 66). This Report brings out
many so-called facts and truths, which again may be a consequence of the simple fact that it
is directed towards the universal audience.
Facts may either be observed facts— this is perhaps the case for most premises— or supposed,
agreed facts, facts that are possible or probable. Facts must conform to those structures of the
real that are accepted by the audience and they will have to be defended against other facts
that may compete with them in the same argumentative context. A fact loses its status as soon
as one starts to question it. It is then no longer used as a starting point but as the conclusion of
an argument. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 68.)
Everything just said about facts is equally applicable to what are called truths. The term
“facts” is generally used to designate objects of precise, limited agreement, whereas the term
“truths” is preferably applied to more complex systems relating to connections between facts.
They may be scientific theories or philosophic or religious conceptions that transcend
experience. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 68-69.)
Now we examine the premises for the justification of making this Report. The first premise
directed towards the American audience is presented as a fact: previous policies were not
efficient; therefore it is implicitly argued that a new, more efficient policy is needed.
“In the past, the United States has tended to initiate policies towards Cuba that were
implemented in isolation from each other. For instance, economic sanctions were
initially imposed with little, if any, support to Cuban civil society, and were not
coupled with initiatives to break the regime’s information blockade or proactively
engage the international community. In addition well-meaning humanitarian policies
were authorized without thorough consideration of the relationship they would have to
the fundamental policy objective of assisting the Cuban people to regain their freedom
and their right to determine their way of life and their future.” (Report, 7.)
previous state of affairs again. There are many other loci to use but I do not consider them necessary to analyse
here because they are not clearly linked to the presenting of threats.
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The second premise, directed primarily towards the Americans (which can be seen as the use
of “us” in connection with the U.S. government), secondarily towards Cubans and
international actors, which is also presented as a fact and reveals why the policy presented in
this Report is efficient. According to the Report the past policies the United States has
initiated towards Cuba were not efficient because they were implemented in isolation from
each other but the current one will be successful due to its holistic approach:
“The Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba sought a more proactive, integrated,
and disciplined approach to undermine the survival strategies of the Castro regime and
contribute to conditions that will help the Cuban people hasten the dictatorship’s end.
The recommendations also focus on actions available to the United States Government,
allowing us to establish a strong foundation on which to build supportive international
efforts.” (Italics added, Report, 15).
The third premise presented as a fact, which is the first premise directed only toward the
Cuban audience, is found in the beginning of the introduction of Chapter 1 where George W.
Bush declares that, “The Cuban people have a constant friend in the United States of
America” (Report, 12). The third premise is presented as a fact, but just by looking at the
history of the relations of the two countries, one can start to question its truthfulness.
Consequently, when one dubious statement is found in the Report, it is only understandable
to critically question the other “facts” in the report as well.
Then we proceed to look at the premises that are the goals of the Report. When the Report
talks about freedom and peace, the truth is used as an object of agreement. The first premise
present as a truth is found in the introductory words of Bush: “freedom is found in every
heart” (Report, 12). Before these words the Report states— as already mentioned— that the
fundamental objective of the Report is to assist the Cuban people to regain their freedom and
their right to determine their way of life and their future.” (Italics added, Report, 7.) I would
question, though, whether Cuban people have ever really had freedom. I would argue that
they should finally gain the freedom independent from the Cuban dictators and the “Big
Brother” from the North.
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A peaceful world can also be seen as a premise for all. As the Report wants to convince the
audience of the need of a new regime in Cuba, which is its main goal, it says that the current
regime is a threat to the peace firstly in Cuba and probably later on in the U.S. too.
“This image [as a prime tourist destination] belies the true state of Cuba’s political,
economic, and social conditions, its status as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the
increasingly erratic behavior of its leadership. We propose increased efforts to
illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba … including its threat potential… . The Castro
regime continues to be a threat not only to its own people, but also to regional stability,
the consolidation of democracy and market economies in the Western Hemisphere, and
the people of the United States. The Castro regime harbors dozens of fugitives from
U.S. justice, including those convicted of killing law enforcement officials. It
aggressively conducts espionage against the United States, including having operated a
spy network, one of whose members was convicted of conspiring to kill U.S. citizens.
The Castro regime also has engaged in other hostile acts against its neighbors and other
democracies in the Hemisphere. On several occasions, Castro has threatened and
orchestrated mass sea-borne migrations to Florida of tens of thousands of Cubans in an
effort to intimidate and harm the United States.” (Report, 9-10, 12.)
This is the first time when a threat is explicitly used in the Report. All the previous threats
were implicit— they were “the backside of the coin”. If one does not support the policies
suggested in the Report, Cubans will remain as “captives” without democratic freedom. If
one does not want to believe this, one ignores the wise words of a “friend” (the U.S.).
Presumptions are more insecure than facts and truths but also they can work as a credible
basis for a convincing argument. Presumptions are linked to things that occur normally and
likely and to which reasonable people can trust. For example, we can presume that the nature
of the act tells something about the nature of the actor; we can presume that good people do
good things and bad people do bad things. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 71-74.)
Some presumptions of the Report that ponder on the future are found in the following
chapter:
45
“There is no way to predict exactly what form a transition in Cuba will take, but what is
certain is that soon the Cuban people will be freed from Fidel Castro’s repressive rule.
Clearly, the agents of change are the Cuban people, who are struggling to define
Cuba’s future. Based on the experience of recent history, one can predict that when
given the opportunity, the Cuban people will choose democracy and a market-based
economy.” (Report, 2.)
However, although presumptions also enjoy universal agreement, adherence to them falls
short of being a maximum and hearers expect the reinforcement of their adherence at a given
moment by other elements. When justification will lessen a status of a fact, this is not true of
presumptions. Actually, in most cases, presumptions are accepted at the start in order to open
the argumentation. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 70.) For example, a presumption in
the previous extract from the Report, concerning the Cubans’ decision to choose democracy
and a market-based economy, would desperately need, but does not receive, reinforcement
later on in the Report.
Some other examples of the premises presented as presumptions in the Report are the
following phrases that are linked to the already presented facts: “No tyrant can stand forever
against the power of liberty” and “Cuba será pronto libre [Cuba will soon be free.]” (Report,
12). The first presumption is based on the fact that every tyrant (before Castro) has always
lost his power at some point— either by dying or losing the power otherwise. The second
presumption is linked to the first one: when Castro will loose his power, Cuba will become
free.
6.2. The Threatened U.S. Value Hierarchies
We have ideas about the desired state of affairs such as world peace and comfort. These
states of affairs are based on values and their hierarchies which is why values enter basically
into every argument. However, it seems that there are no common values to all human beings.
The values are valid to the universal audience only when their contents are not clearly
defined. With the help of values, one expresses either, a positive or a negative stand to a
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certain object. For example “good” and “true” are positive values, whereas “bad” and “false”
are negative values. Most importantly values are used to direct people in their choices and to
convince people of the already-made choices. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 75.)
Values are, thus, comparable to facts: when one of the interlocutors puts forward a value, one
must argue to get rid of it, under pain of refusing the discussion; and in general, the argument
will imply that other values are accepted. It is by being vague that the values appear as
universal values and claim a status similar to that of facts. It is, however, only the
non-universal aspect of values that gives them a status of their own. (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 75-76.)
“According to E. Dupréel, universal values deserve to be called 'values of persuasion'
because they are ‘means of persuasion which, from a sociological viewpoint, are that
and no more than that; they are, as it were, spiritual tools which can be completely
separated from the material they make it possible to shape, anterior to the moment it is
used, and remaining intact after use, available, as before, for other occasions’.” (Italics
in the original text, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 76.)
As such, freedom is a rather universal value and the reader can easily agree with the Report
on the need for freedom for the Cuban people. However, when the “freedom” is more clearly
defined in the Report, it is defined from the perspective of a democratic country. Therefore, it
is not appealing to the universal audience anymore but to a large audience consisting of the
supporters of democracy:
“Cubans continue to be denied fundamental freedoms. They cannot form independent,
alternative political parties outside of the communist party, elect representatives of
their own choosing, form free associations, or freely express themselves. They are
denied recourse to an independent judiciary that could protect their rights.” (Report,
1-2.)
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Furthermore, freedom to people who have lived “in captivity” all their lives is not only a
positive thing; when one is free, one is on his or her own. Some people do better with
freedom than others. This is something that the Report is not addressing at all.
The difference between facts and values can be best understood with the help of an example.
It is a fact that Fidel Castro continues to maintain one of the world’s regimes. With the help
of values the Report expresses a negative stand to the regime: “Fidel Castro continues to
maintain one of the world’s most repressive regimes” (Italics added, Report, 12). Similarly it
is a fact that there are Cubans who defy the regime. With the help of values the report
expresses a positive stand to these Cubans: “Brave Cubans continue to defy the regime”
(Italics added, Report, 12).
Perelman divides values to the abstract values, such as justice or truth and to the concrete
values, such as Cuba or the Church. Values are abstract when they are not attached to a
certain person or institution, which is the case with concrete values. He believes that one
cannot create an argument without the presence of both but it is up to the situation as to what
kind of values will become more important in the rhetoric in question. One observation is that
concrete values are more commonly used in conservative societies, whereas abstract values
are easily connected to the criticising of the society. Abstract values are tightly related to the
societies in change— they are used for defending the need of change. This is one reason why
it is easy to see many abstract values in the Report that deals with the changing of the Cuban
regime. On the other hand, President Bush and his government are conservative, which can
be  seen  in  the  use  of  many  concrete  values  in  the  Report  as  well.  (Perelman  &
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 77-79.)
Argumentation relies not only on values but also on hierarchies, such as the superiority of
men over animals, of the just over the useful. However, such hierarchies often remain
implicit. The knowledge of the value hierarchies of the audience is actually more crucial than
knowing their exact values. Most values are indeed shared by a great number of audiences,
and a particular audience is characterised less by which values it accepts than by the way it
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grades them. Values may be admitted by many different audiences but the degree of their
acceptance will vary from one audience to another. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971,
80-83.)
To the quantitative hierarchies we can oppose the heterogeneous hierarchies. Values are
generally considered interconnected. It is this connection between them that lays the
foundation for their subordination: for instance the “end” value is often deemed superior to
that which is the “means” or the “cause” value is ranked superior to that of constituting
“effect.” (Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca 1971, 81)
The reason why one feels obliged to order values in hierarchy, is that simultaneous pursuit of
these values leads to incompatibilities. To avoid the incompatibilities, one is obliged to make
choices, in other words, to order values in hierarchy. For example, to survive society needs to
have an ideological basis as well as a material basis for its functioning. Generally speaking,
Americans have repeatedly interpreted Cuban value hierarchies in a wrong way. For example,
they were convinced that, as the Americans would invade the Bay of Pigs, all the Cubans
would embrace them and help them to take over the country. Instead of the economic
stability that the U.S. would have provided, Cubans chose to help Castro to regain Cuba’s
manhood. (Rabe 2006.)
This confusion of value hierarchies could be explained by the mixing of the values of Cubans
living in Cuba and the values of Cuban-Americans. The Cubans who first left Cuba to move
to the United States were prominently from the (upper) middle class. The majority of the
Cubans who stayed in Cuba were the poor ones who welcomed the socialism
wholeheartedly.
In the Report the “right” values— such as freedom and economical well being— are shown to
be threatened if the Castro regime will not cease to exist. However, the role of threatening is
not as crucial here as I presumed it would be.
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Premises: Threats:
Facts:
1. The previous policies were not
efficient, therefore a new policy is
needed.
2. This policy will be efficient due to
its holistic approach.
3. The U.S. is a true friend of Cubans.
If this policy will not be implemented the
consequences will be severe.
If people/organisations will continue to
help Cubans without taking into
consideration the holistic plan of this
policy, significant losses will be evident.
If Cubans will not listen to the advice of a
friend, the misery will deepen.
Truths:
1. Freedom is found in the hearts of
Cubans.
2. Castro regime is a threat to peace.
Cubans will continue to be miserable
without freedom.
Peaceful state of affairs will be shaken in
Cuba, U.S. and the whole world.
Presumptions:
1. The Cuban people will choose
democracy and a market-based
economy.
2. No tyrant can stand forever against
the power of liberty.
3. Cuba will soon be free.
If the audience does not believe in the
presumptions, things will get worse.
Values:
1.   Freedom as a universal value. If the audience does not behave according
to the recommendations of the Report,
their values will be violated.
Value hierarchies:
Not directly linked to threats.
Table 2. The Premises of the Report.
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I believe I have now made the premises of the argumentation of the Report clear enough in
order to move on to the actual argumentation techniques. These techniques are used to carry
on the work laid out in the premises to the conclusions as well. The threats revealed in the
premises are further strengthened with the following techniques.
6.3. The Argumentation Techniques for Creating the Threat Discourse
With the help of argumentation techniques one aims at obtaining a justification for the claims
used in argumentation. They are the resources of language used for the credibility of claims.
In the Report they are used to convince the American readers of the justification of the
calculated budget in hastening Cuba’s transition. Similarly these techniques are used for
convincing the Cuban audience of the authenticity of the good intentions of the American
government. Most importantly, these techniques are used to convince the reader of the threat
that the Castro government poses to the Cuban people, the United States, and the democratic
countries in the world.
However, how convincing an argument will become does not depend only on the logical
structure of the argumentation but it also takes into consideration the causal links of the
writer(s), the goal and the means achieving it, the examples, metaphors and oppositions used
in the text.
The actual argumentation techniques can be divided into two main groups: to the associative
techniques and to the dissociative ones. Perelman considers the associative argumentation to
combine different elements to the same group, under the same heading, whereas, dissociative
argumentation tries to separate two elements previously linked together.
The associative techniques can be further divided into three main groups: quasi-logical
arguments, arguments based on the structure of reality, and the argumentation concerning the
relations establishing the structure of reality.
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Quasi-Logical Arguments Highlighting the Threat of Information Blockade
Quasi-logical argumentation is similar to the formal reasoning of logics, but it differs from it
because it requires a reduction of a non-formal character so that the arguments appear
demonstrative. Furthermore, quasi-logical arguments derive their persuasive strength from
their similarity with the logical reasoning. However, by the terms of logic it is very difficult
to express the wanted things in the natural language. The result of this is that one often resorts
to other forms of argumentation to make it convincing enough. (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 193-194.)
Comparison to historical events is an example of quasi-logical arguments. The Report states
that the Cuban civil society is— similarly to the Polish civil society two decades
ago— showing the willingness to fight against the current misery:
“These people demonstrate the same determination to challenge the system that was
evident in the Polish ‘Solidarity’ movement two decades ago. The same resilience and
determination of Czech leader Vaclac Havel’s Charter 77 and of the ‘Solidarity’
movement is also embodied today in the activists of the Cuban independent library
movement, and the scores of independent journalists who risk everything so that the
world no longer can claim ignorance about the repressive practices of a ruthless
dictatorship.” (Report, 16.)
This similarity of historical facts justifies the similar means that the U.S. has in mind for
Cuba: “By continuing to isolate the Castro regime while supporting the democratic
opposition and empowering an emerging civil society, the U.S. can help the Cuban people in
their efforts to effect positive political and social change in their country” (Report, 16).
Another example of a quasi-logical argument is to refer to scientific tests (which is probably
more easily associated with quasi-logical argumentation than the comparison to historical
events):
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“According to a December 2003 poll of Cuban public opinion, more than 75 percent of
the Cuban public watch state-run television or listen to state radio on a weekly basis.
The regime uses these media programs to advance its propaganda war against Cuban
civil society and other forces for change. The Cuban public, however, is increasingly
seeking external and non-state sources of information … Access to the equipment
necessary to receive foreign media, however, remains a critical obstacle to empowering
civil society. The Castro regime blocks many external radio signals and limits the
ability of Cubans to obtain the necessary equipment to receive international broadcasts.
Accordingly to the poll, only 15 percent of Cubans had access to satellite channels.”
(Report, 26.)
In this example one easily sees how the quasi-logical argument is used to highlight the threat
that exists in Cuba due to its information blockade. People in Cuba have no freedom— they
are continuously being brainwashed by the regime which opposes change. However, Cubans
seek ways out of this propaganda, but in order to do this, they need help from outside. Similar
to the use of scientific tests is the using of numbers: ”There are estimated to be only 270,000
computers in Cuba, with a paltry 58,000 connected to the national Internet network, which
blocks access to most sites on the worldwide web” (Report, 27).
Arguments Based on the Structure of Reality Warn about Naivety
“[T]he arguments based on the structure of reality make use of this structure to
establish a solidarity between accepted judgements and others which one wishes to
promote” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 261).
The arguments that apply to relations of succession, which unite a phenomenon to its
consequences or causes and also, the arguments, which apply to the relations of co-existence,
which unite a person to his actions or a group to the individuals who form it, are examples of
the argumentation based on the structure of reality. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971,
262)
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A causal explanation found in the Report states that the good American intentions have been
one cause for the survival of the Castro regime:
“To alleviate the hardships of a portion of the Cuban population, the United States has
implemented various measures by which those with family members in Cuba can send
cash remittances to them; travel to Cuba carrying gifts; and ship ‘gift parcels’. ... Castro
has exploited these policies by effectively shifting burdens that ought to be assumed by
the Cuban state and by profiting enormously from these transactions. ... And it is this
source of resources, on a net basis, which is by far the largest hard currency source for
the Castro regime after tourism”. (Report, 33-34.)
The threat that follows from this is that if the Americans do things with good intentions,
without listening the U.S. government, the Castro regime will ruthlessly continue to misuse
the flow of resources from the U.S. for maintenance of the current regime and the misery of
Cuban people.
The arguments that apply to a relation of co-existence, which unites a person to his actions,
are also present in the Report, mainly in dealing with the “tyrant” Fidel Castro and his
“ruthless actions” which can be seen for example in his encouragement of prostitution:
“Cuban women choose prostitution ‘because they like sex’”(Report, 18).
The Structure of the Cuban Reality Needs Modification
When using argumentation that aims at modifying the structure of reality, one either tries to
arrive at a generalisation from a particular case, or one reasons by analogy. There are at least
three types of argumentation arriving at a generalisation from particular case: argumentation
by example, illustration, or different models. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 350-398.)
This is the argumentation technique that is used the most in the Report. The Report states
examples of all the areas that have to be dealt with in order to hasten the change in Cuba.
These examples are connected to the concept of threat so that it is implied that, if the areas
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mentioned are not dealt with, the consequences will become increasingly severe. It gives
examples how the Castro regime is suppressing the civil society, which leads to an
acceptance of the American intervention.
“There is a growing international consensus on the nature of the Castro regime and the
need for fundamental political and economic change on the island. This consensus
coalesced, in large part, after the regime’s brutal March-April 2003 crackdown on
peaceful pro-democracy activists, an act properly characterized as the most severe
repression of peaceful political activists in the history of Cuba, and certainly the most
significant act of political repression in Latin America in a decade.” (Report, 10.)
Furthermore, it gives examples how this has been done successfully in other parts of the
world, which means that it is possible to achieve in Cuba too. Therefore, in addition to the
threats, also the possibilities are pictured in the Report. Similarly the Report gives examples
of encouraging international diplomatic efforts to support Cuban civil society and to
challenge the Castro regime. One of them is showing the poor state of labour rights:
“Currently, Cuban workers do not have the right to organize freely into independent unions.
Cuban citizens who attempt to organise independent unions have been persecuted and in
some cases, imprisoned.” (Report, 47.)
The Dissociation of Concepts Helping to Separate the Truths from Lies
Dissociation aims at breaking the connection between two elements that have been
considered united. Lack of connection between two elements may be proved by actual or
mental experience, by changes in the conditions governing a situation and by the
examination of certain variables. The technique of breaking connecting links therefore
consists in affirming that elements, which should remain separate and independent, have
been improperly associated. When one claims that the appearance does not correspond to the
reality, or theory to practice, one is using dissociative argumentation. (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 411–412, 415–450.)
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In the Report dissociative argumentation is used in connection with the Castro regime. The
Report accuses the regime of giving a wrong— in other words, a too good— impression of the
state of affairs in Cuba at the moment:
“Cuba presents itself internationally as a prime tourist destination, as a center for
bio-technological innovation, as a successful socialist state that has improved the
standard of living of its people, and as a model for the world in terms of health,
education, and race relations. This image belies the true state of Cuba’s political,
economic and social conditions and the increasingly erratic behaviour of its
leadership.” (Report, 44.)
Similarly the Report claims the regime is not being honest when it gives the impression that
women and Afro-Cubans are doing well in the country. “Castro denies the fact that his
policies have forced women into prostitution, claiming that Cuban women choose
prostitution ‘because they like sex’” (Report, 18). ”Afro-Cubans and mixed-ethnicity Cubans
comprise 62 percent of the population. Yet despite the regime’s incessant rhetoric of social
inclusion, Afro-Cubans are underrepresented in leadership positions and continue to be
socially marginalized.” (Report, 18-19.)
Dissociation technique is used, in short, to open the eyes of the international audience: Cuba
is neither a prime tourist destination nor a safe society for Cubans to live in.
I present here the summary of the argumentation techniques before proceeding to the next
level of the analysis:
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Argumentation techniques: Aims at:
These techniques are used to convince the
reader of the threat that the Castro regime
poses to the Cuban people,to the United
States, and to all the democratic countries
in the world.
Getting the audience to act in intended
way.
Quasi-logical arguments: 1. Comparison to historical events
shows that there is a same kind of
willingness to fight against the
misery among Cubans, as was the
case in the successful Polish civil
society movement two degades
ago. Therefore, Cubans should be
encouraged in their efforts.
2. Referring to scientific tests shows
that the regime is at propaganda
war with the Cuban civil society
and that Cubans seek ways out.
3. The use of numbers shows how bad
the current situation in Cuba is and
how the outside world can help to
improve it.
Arguments based on the structure
of reality:
1. What follows from a causal
explanation about good
humanitarian intentions of
Americans, is that it is better to stop
trying to do good, if one is not
completely sure that it will benefit
Cubans in the long run.
2. As Fidel Castro has said and done
many dubious things in the past,
the threat is that he will continue to
do increasingly more suspicious
things.
Table 3. The Argumentation techniques used in the Report.
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The successful argumentation analysis is not based only on analysing the different
argumentation techniques, instead, it is important to analyse especially how with the
different strategies of language one can move the consensus achieved on the premises to be
valid in the case of the controversial conclusion as well. Efficient arguments alone are not
efficient enough; they have to support each other in the same context. After achieving this
coherence of the argumentation, one is ready to consider how to get the audience to act. All
of the argumentation techniques receive rhetorical force from the pending narrative— the
interruption of the story as soon as the motivation for an action has been created and
identities have been established for the actors involved in action.
6.4. How the Report Ignites Passion
“The rhetorical force of the pending narrative comes from its sudden interruption: as
soon as the motivation for an action has been created and as soon as identities have
been established for the actors involved in the action, the story is interrupted, brought
to a halt” (Törrönen 2000, 81).
The storylines  that  I  was able  to  find with the actantial  model  helped me to find also the
pending narratives. As I shared in Chapter 4, in the model of the canonical narrative schema
Greimas proposes that an ideal narrative has three mini-narratives: the qualifying test, the
decisive test and the sanctifying test (Greimas & Courtés 1982, 203-206). The pending
narrative, however, fulfils only the qualifying test of the canonical narrative schema. At the
same time, it also constructs for the narrator and the audience specific subject positions in
relation to the action set forward. (Törrönen 1999, 155.)
In the Report the dimension of the represented action, which Greimas calls “utterance”, tells
the reader the current state of affairs in Cuba, including its threat potential. In the dimension
of interaction between the narrator and the audience, “enunciation”, the Report urges the two
different audiences that I presented in the Chapter 6.
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The qualifying test provides four modalities for the subject in order to ensure success in
action. They, together with certain semantic content, will provide the action with its
legitimacy (obligation) and its direction (will) and also indicate what kinds of means
(abilities and competencies) are needed to achieve the goal. (Törrönen 1999, 159.)
The opponents and anti-subjects illustrate what kind of resistance the subject has to
overcome in order to achieve the object. At the same time they tell what kind of means are
not appropriate for achieving the object. They also help the “identity building” by drawing
the boundary between us (good people) and others (bad people). (Törrönen 1999, 159.)
The last page of Chapter 1 lists recommendations for the U.S. government on how to act. To
get the acceptance of the augmentation to the budget— the primary means— is the main goal
of the report. In other words, the main goal is to convince the U.S. people that a free Cuba is
worth the new budget.
Alternatively that the main goal is the implicit one which I already discussed in the Chapter 2:
strengthening of the U.S. identity as a friendly country rather than the “enemy” country. The
need for this exists as Minkkinen (2004) presents in his dissertation. The U.S. has lost the
respect of the other social actors by using its power and violence too much. This report could
therefore be seen as an attempt to restore its image as the benevolent helper of the countries
whose people lack freedom.
The pending narrative receives its power to influence by using efficiently the spatial,
temporal and positional aspects of identity building. First, it is commonly underlined in the
pending narrative that there is a danger of the Other (the Castro regime) against whom the
subject has to fight. When the threat is underlined the pending narrative tries to create an
impression that Our (democratic countries) values (respect for freedom and human rights)
are at stake.
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The first aim of the pending narrative is to awaken within the audience the will to defend the
borders (which the narrator has realised are threatened) or to get the audience to act in order
to obtain necessary borders. Second, when telling the pending narrative the narrator weakens
opposite or parallel histories of action (previous reports were not efficient) and procedures
for action (the well-meaning humanitarian projects do not work when implemented in
isolation from other procedures), so that his or her action plan would have a goal that is as
clear as possible. (Törrönen 1999, 61-62.)
7. Conclusions–"Freedom Is Not Free"
"If I have to choose the lesser of two evils, I choose neither.”—Karl Kraus
7.1. Conclusions on the U.S. Foreign Policy Rhetoric on Cuba and the Castro Regime
With the help of Greimas' theories, I was able to see the stories represented in the Report
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba as a combination of the hero stories (in which the
subject hero rescues the receivers from the adversary) and tragedies (in which the subject is
not empowered to fight for achieving the objects). The Report shows both of them possible
but not necessary. As Alker (1996, 269-270) puts it: “Life is not a myth or a fairy tale with a
guaranteed happy ending; neither is it an inevitable tragedy, one that encompasses all of
Western civilization or the human species.”
The pending narrative serves as a motivation to choose the hero story and do what the report
recommends; otherwise it suggests that the tragedy is inevitable. Cuba is constructed as a
threat as long as it is rule by Castro. The greatest threat, that is present in all the stories, but
most apparent in one of them (See Attachment 1, Table VIII), is the succession of power
from Fidel to Raúl and the continuation of the current regime. William LeoGrande (1997)
has argued that Washington does not hate communism or Cuba’s violations of human rights.
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The hatred of Washington is focused on Fidel Castro (Siltala 2000, 27). That is why all the
policy suggestions are aimed at removing the Castro brothers from power. For example, the
economic blockade will not be removed if either one is in power even if the country would
declare itself democratic.
The situation in Cuba was linked to a heroic story of great warfare in which humanity— the
United States— has battled against the forces of darkness to destroy the evil. The “evil” over
the  years  has  been,  according  to  Campbell  (1990,  268)— in  addition  to  the  Castro
regime— for example Red China, North Vietnam, Nicaragua, Libya and terrorists. In recent
years the U.S. had more or less left Castro alone, probably hoping that the economic
blockade would start to work in a desired way. However, now that Hussein is no longer a
threat,  and when Iran has  been dealt  with,  the U.S.  will  be able  to  direct  all  its  efforts  to
undermine the Castro regime.
In the Cuban-American press the image of Castro is overtly identified either with Hitler or a
demon (Siltala 2000, 20). This is not the first time the U.S. links a foreign ruler to a demon; it
told a  similar  story first,  during the Gulf  War and later  during the Iraqi  War.  As Shapiro
(1992, 469) has said, the U.S. attempts to re-establish its damaged collective subjectivity by
the reproduction of the “Enemy”.
The stories presented wanted to give the audiences the causes, the effects and the motivation
to act in accordance with the U.S. recommendations. This is done by efficient argumentation.
The premises (facts, truths, presumptions, values and their hierarchies) for the argumentation
are convincing and the argumentation techniques (the associative and dissociative ones) are
used to support the premises. Although there are some weak spots present as well. Some
statements reveal the enormous emotional charge of the Americans, which weakens its
efficiency towards the international audience. However, these kinds of statements may
appeal to the American audience.
61
Freedom is not, however, free. The argumentation techniques were used to convince the
American readers of the justification of the calculated budget to hastening Cuba’s transition.
Similarly these techniques were used for convincing the Cuban audience of the authenticity
of the good intentions of the American government. As the Report wants to convince the
audience of the need of a new regime in Cuba, it says that the current regime is a threat to the
peace firstly in Cuba and mostly likely later on in the U.S. and the other democratic countries
as well. With the help of values the Report expresses a negative stand to the Castro regime
and a positive stand to Cubans in general.
This thesis presents an analysis of one picture— created through American “storytellers”— of
the situation in Cuba and its consequences first to the United States and finally to the rest of
the world. This thesis familiarized the reader with the foreign policy rhetoric of the United
States concerning its relations with Cuba. In this thesis, I have exposed the logic which the
U.S. used for producing the image of Cuba presented in the Report. While uncovering the
logic, also the main values of the U.S. became clear. Most of them, such as freedom and
peace, are directly connected to the main theme of this story— “threat”, as I have already
showed. If the Castro brothers continue as the head of Cuba, neither freedom nor peace is
guaranteed for the Western hemisphere.
7.1.1. A Discourse of Threat
The sociosemiotic tools helped me to discover that the U.S. Report can be seen as a grand
discourse of threat. The main threat is that the Castro regime will not cease to exist and from
that follows many other threats such as the violations of human rights and increasing poverty
of the Cuban people. This was not a surprise, since the United States has had the tendency to
create discourses of threat in its foreign policy, which is, according to Campbell (1992), a
normal feature of foreign policy in general. In foreign policy different elements are actively
created as threats to the others, so that the existence of the own country would become
justified.
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I presume that the values of the international community, such as human rights and
democracy, are part of the argumentation tactic of the Report. They could be considered to
disguise the main agenda of the United States on Cuba, which could be the legitimization of
the current political structure in the United States, which is, furthermore, part of the overall
identity building of the U.S. (the justification of its existence and recovery of its manhood,
lost due to Castro’s Cuba).
The territorial expansionism has always played an important role in the identity building of
the U.S.— as I referred to Campbell in Chapter 2. Furthermore, subduing the archenemy— a
communist leader— would lift up the country’s self-esteem that has lost the respect of other
international actors (see e.g. Minkkinen 2004).
However, threats are not created merely because of a country's identity building. In
international relations power is not solely based on weapons and wealth. An integral part of
power is the ability to influence the perceptions of the other actors concerning threat to
security. Creating mutual understanding of the enemy is, therefore, an enormous tool for
power. (Ojanen 2005, 17.) The discourses of threat created in the Report can, accordingly, be
seen as a struggle for power in the realm of international relations. The U.S. is not alone in
this struggle, as I have pointed out Cubans too— starting from Martí— have actively
portrayed the U.S. as a “monster”.
C. Wright Mills (1960, 177) argued just after the Cuban revolution that it is actually the
United States that one can largely blame if Cuba might harden into a dictatorial tyranny. He
professed the following:
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“The policies the United States has pursued and is pursuing against Cuba are based
upon a profound ignorance, and are shot through with hysteria. … More than any other
single factor, these U.S. policies are forcing the Cuban Government to become ‘harder’,
to become more restrictive of freedom of expression inside Cuba. In brief, they are
forcing Cubans to identify all ‘minority views’ with ‘counter-revolution’. And they are
forcing the Cuban Government to identify ‘anti-communism’ with
‘counter-revolution’.”
Could it be then, that all that the U.S. is accusing Cuba of is actually a natural reaction to its
own actions? Would there be any threats for Cubans and for the Americans if the U.S. would
change its policies?
 I argue that one should not try to make the world too simple. One should not hide the
existing problems by creating new problems outside our countries. Instead, one should try to
learn to live with the acknowledgement that our countries (in the same way as we as human
beings) are never “ready”. One should try to improve constantly and slowly, and to
remember that there are no easy ways or short cuts. To discover the right path to the
actualization of the state one can use the expertise of the social scientists.
I see the finding of better ways (than making enemies and waging wars) to secure the
identities of countries as the most important task of the international politics at the moment.
Perhaps the next step is, as Shapiro (1996, 478) suggests, “a comparative ethnology of
modern societies in search of differing levels of acceptance of inner disorder.” He continues
to stress the importance of getting to know more about what generates demands for
coherence within both the orders of the self and the collectivity, for the suspicion deepens
that these demands are responsible for the interpretations that map international or external
dangers. (Shapiro 1996, 478.)
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However, in a way the U.S. tendency to see threats can also be seen as a positive thing: if one
is able to notice the threats before they become reality, one might be able to remove the threat
entirely. In other words, it could be regarded as an efficient prevention of conflicts. It is true
that the United States have also been able to help the bloodless transitions from dictatorship
to democracy in different parts of the world. Furthermore, using argumentation in modifying
a pre-existing state of affairs is always better than doing so by using force:
“The use of argumentation implies that one has renounced resorting to force alone, that
value is attached to gaining adherence of one’s interlocutor by means of reasoned
persuasion, and that one is not regarding him as an object, but appealing to his free
judgment. Recourse to argumentation assumes the establishment of a community of
minds,  which,  while  it  lasts,  excludes  the  use  of  violence.”  (Perelman  &
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, 55.)
In any case, what continues to trouble me is that the U.S. is not talking with Cuba even if it is
talking about Cuba, quite often. This is understandable, though, as one glances the present
legislation of the U.S.: talking to the Castro brothers is not useful since even agreeing with
them on the implementation of a market economy in Cuba would not stop the blockade
because it is prevented by the U.S. constitution. Besides which, I do not believe that the
Castro brothers would ever agree on it. I see the continued socialism in Cuba— despite the
decrease in the standard of living of the Cuban people— as a question of pride.
As long as Fidel lives, he cannot give in to the United States because, if he would do that, all
his work would have been in vain. He has been proud to be able (as a previously dependent
island state) to stand against the superpower all these years and he cannot loose face. Because
the U.S. wants to regain its “lost face” it cannot give in by stopping the blockade. I believe
that mediation is the only way to go forward in this conflict. My opinion is, that the mediator
should be the international community (for example either the United Nations or the
European Union) and the mediation should happen between Cubans in Cuba and
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American-Cubans. Furthermore, sociological research on both sides could contribute
significantly to an efficient mediation.
Siltala (2000, 11) argues that when Fidel Castro passes away the role of the rich and active
Cuban community in the U.S. will be pivotal when assessing the relationships between the
countries. This argument receives support from the fact that the anti-Castro Cuban
community in the U.S. was also represented in the Commission that created the Report.33
7.2. On Research Moral and Ethics
In my thesis, I have taken into consideration the research ethics throughout the research
process. Firstly, I was analysing a public document and did not, therefore, need permission to
its use as the research material. Also the people mentioned in the thesis (for example
President Bush and the controversial U.S. Congressmen) are public figures and therefore I
did not need to change their names or hide their identities in any way. Moreover, I have been
as objective as I can be while conducting the research. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the use of
theory has helped me to be objective in a way that I have not been projecting my own life and
values to the analysis. However, as the sociology classic Max Weber has famously argued, a
completely  value-free  analysis  does  not  exist,  even  if  that  has  to  be  the  goal  of  every
researcher (Gronow 1996, 276).
I have critically analysed in what kind of foreign political circumstances the Report
Commission for assistance to a Free Cuba was created and to where it locates in the time line
of the historically constituted international order. Furthermore, I have examined what
meaning it could have for both Cubans and, especially, for the United States. I think that the
33 Since the revolution in 1959 approximately one and half million Cubans have moved to the United States.
They are the third largest Hispanic community in the U.S. According to Siltala (2000, 11) they are leading the
U.S. foreign policy concerning Cuba. The lobbying of Cuban-Americans in Washington is highly
influential— only the Israeli lobbyers have more influence on the U.S. government (Siltala 2000, 22). The main
channel for Cuban-Americans to raise their voice is through the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)
that was established in 1981. CANF is an organization that overtly opposes the Castro regime (Siltala 2000, 22).
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knowledge of the past is vital when considering where we go from here. I also hope that when
the interest of the international community is directed towards Cuba and the United States
early enough, the U.S. could not be able to use the Clausewitz's (1986) justification of war
(“war is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means”) if the things will not
proceed as the U.S. wished they would when the Castro regime is no more. In the light of
everything already mentioned in this thesis and as Minkkinen (2004) stated in his dissertation,
it is very likely that at some point, the U.S. would turn to violence, also in the Cuba-issue, in
order to maintain its hegemony.
7.3. Development Possibilities— Quo Vadis Cuba?
The theory about intelligibility I used in this analysis to discover the threats, and how they
were presented, in the Report was achieved by combining three ways of examining textual
structures. This, in some way, could be seen as too ambitious a task for a Master's Thesis. By
concentrating on one method I might have been able to make the reading experience more
pleasurable and maybe I would have been able to go deeper into the analysis itself. The
strength of using these three different ways of examining the textual structures of the Report
is that it gave an accessible insight to all of the research questions and I was able to obtain a
broader view of the Report.
Greimas' semiotic analysis is a very good tool for structuring the material. However, I found
that it did not provide a deep enough insight to the research material. Perelman's rhetoric, on
the other hand, paved a way for a more intriguing path to the research material and to a more
comprehensive understanding of the semiotics of international politics. Then again, his
argumentation analysis is very complex, which meant that an explanation required perhaps
too large a portion of the whole study. I believe, however, that a possible continuation of the
study into the U.S. foreign policy discourse in respect to Cuba would benefit from a further
application of Perelman's rhetoric.
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The next step could be, for example, to compare the argumentation techniques of the
American Report and a similar report prepared in Cuba. It could answer questions, such as,
what kind of plans, if any, does Cuba have for itself as its leader passes away? What kind of
threats do the Cubans depict in their policies? Are the threats to Cubans linked, more, to
foreign policies or domestic policies? This comparison could open up new horizons within
the U.S. foreign policy on Cuba by taking into consideration the Cuban perspective34.
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Attachment 1. Actantial models of the Report
Before presenting each actantial model, I explain shortly what is told in each chapter.
Executive Summary of the Report (xiii-xxxi):
In the executive summary the reader is informed of “America’s commitment to stand with
the Cuban people against the tyranny of Fidel Castro’s regime” (Report, xiii) and the Report
is one indicator of the commitment. Then it is told that through all the different methods the
aim of the Report is to help the Cubans to change the societal structure of Cuba peacefully
from dictatorship to democracy and market economy, which will result to the improvement
of the living standards of Cuban people.
Table I. Actantial model of the executive summary of the report (xiii-xxxi).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States and especially its Cuban population living in
Florida.
the United States.
A peaceful transition to a representative democracy and a free
market economy, ending decades of an oppressive dictatorship
that will result to the improvement of the living standards of the
Cuban people.
the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
the Castro regime.
Especially the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other
countries, organisations and people who support the current
government economically— consciously or unconsciously.
the Cuban people.
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In the story structure of the executive summary the sender— in other words the actor who has
realised the task to accomplish, the object to attain— is the United States and especially the
Cuban population living in the U.S. Furthermore, one can clearly find the United States
presented as the subject hero and the Cuban people as the receiver. The object is to change
the structure of the Cuban society in order for the Cuban people to become happier.
Anti-subject is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The helpers of the subject are the
Cubans living in Florida, the NGOs in Cuba and possibly the rest of the Western world. The
helpers of the anti-subject are the Chavéz’s Venezuelan government, and other bodies that
assist the regime to survive. The greatest threat seems to be the implementation of a
succession strategy and the continuation of the Castro regime even after Fidel Castro's death.
Introduction of the Report (1-4):
In the introduction the sad state of Cuban society under Castro is more highlighted. It is also
mentioned many times that the agents of the change are Cubans not Americans: “Clearly, the
agents of change are the Cuban people, who are struggling to define Cuba’s future” (Report,
2). The U.S. attempts to avoid the problem of intervening in changing of the structure of a
sovereign country by talking about sovereign rights of people: “The fundamental goal of any
U.S. assistance to a free Cuba must be to empower and respect the sovereign rights of the
Cuban people.”
Table II. Actantial model of the introduction of the report (1-4).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States, other countries that the U.S. wants to include
in the “strong international coalition” and the United Nations
Human Rights Commission.
the Cuban people.
to free the Cuban people from Fidel Castro’s repressive rule.
the United States, the international community.
the Castro regime.
Everyone supporting the regime’s “succession strategy” from
Fidel to Raul Castro.
the Cuban people.
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The sender is the United States, but not alone: “Countries around the globe and the United
Nations Human Rights Commission increasingly recognize the oppressive nature of the
Castro regime” (Report, 1). Next, one can find the Cuban people presented as the subject
hero and as well as the receiver. The object is to free the Cuban people “from Fidel Castro’s
repressive rule” (Report, 2). Anti-subject is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The
helpers of the subject are the United States and the international community. The opponent is
everybody who assists the regime to succeed from Fidel to Raul Castro. The greatest threat
seems to be the same as in the executive summary: the implementation of a succession
strategy and the continuation of the Castro regime even after Fidel Castro's death.
The text in Chapter 1 was possible to arrange into six following actantial
models.
1. Empower Cuban Civil Society (15-25):
This chapter discusses how the Castro dictatorship has made the Cuban civil society weak
and divided. However, recently the changes have started to occur thanks to brave dissidents
who have expressed demands for change and freedom despite its dangers. The U.S. interprets
this as a call for help to empower the Cuban civil society. “Cuban civil society is not lacking
spirit, desire, or determination; it is hampered by a lack of materials and support needed to
bring about these changes” (Report, 16).
Table III.  The 1st Actantial  model  of  the Chapter 1:  Empower Cuban Civil  Society
(15-25).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
"brave" Cuban dissidents such as Raúl Rivero, Dr. Oscar Elías
Biscet, Martha Beatriz Roque, and Oswaldo Paya35.
the Cuban people (the democratic opposition in Cuba, the
families of political prisoners, independent actors – the U.S. is
encouraging especially the youth, women and Afro-Cubans to
become subjects in strengthening Cuban civil society).
to find ways to empower Cuban civil society and strengthen the
democratic opposition through material assistance and training.
the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, and the
35 See the WebPages of the Cuban opposition: http://www.lanuevacuba.com/oposicion-debate.htm
(2005-12-25).
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Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
third-country organisations, religious and faith-based groups.
the Castro regime.
— .
the Cuban civil society.
The senders are the Cuban dissidents who have attracted action to “Castro’s 45-year strategy
of co-opting or crushing independent actors” (Report, 15). In addition, one finds the Cubans
also presented as the subject and the Cuban civil society as the receiver. The subject in reality
is maybe more the U.S. than Cubans but the report does not want to give that impression. The
object is to find ways to empower Cuban civil society and strengthen the democratic
opposition through material assistance and training. Anti-subject is the Castro’s regime. The
helpers of the subject are the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs, the third-country
organisations, and religious and faith-based groups. The helper of the anti-subject is  not
portrayed. The threat is the continuous lack of freedom which is manifested in the violations
of human rights.
2. Break the Information Blockade (26-28):
This chapter talks about the information isolation in which the Cubans live today: “Strict
editorial control over newspapers, television, and radio by the regime’s repressive apparatus
prevents the Cuban people from obtaining accurate information on such issues as the Cuban
economy and wide-scale and systematic violations of human rights and abridgement of
fundamental freedoms” (Report, 26). It also introduces the ways the U.S. can help to break
this information blockade caused by the Castro regime.
78
Table IV. The 2nd Actantial model of the Chapter 1— Break the Information Blockade
(26-28).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States/Cubans
the United States.
In concert with efforts to strengthen Cuban civil society, and
building on the excellent work already underway by U.S.
Government broadcasting entities, the Commission
recommends a near-term program to deploy COMMANDO
SOLO as an airborne platform for radio and television
transmissions on a regular basis; an increase in the use of
third-country private radio stations for broadcasting media
materials on the island.
Cubans and the third countries.
the Castro regime, in particular, the Cuban Communist Party
(CCP).
— .
the Cuban people.
The sender can be either the United States or Cubans. In this actant model, one can clearly
find the United States presented as the subject hero and the Cuban people as the receiver. The
object is to build on the work already underway by the U.S. Government broadcasting
entities; the Commission recommends a near-term program to deploy COMMANDO SOLO
as an airborne platform for radio and television transmissions on a regular basis; an increase
in the use of third-country private radio stations for broadcasting media materials on the
island. Anti-subject is the Castro regime and particularly the Cuban Communist Party (CCP).
The helpers of the subject are Cubans and the third countries. The helper of the anti-subject is
not presented. The threat is the continued information blockade and propaganda war directed
towards Cuban citizens.
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3. Deny Revenues to the Cuban Dictatorship (28-44):
In this chapter the U.S. government tells that the Castro regime is using the American people
to support the dictatorship: “[T]he regime facilitates tourism by assisting U.S. travellers to
evade U.S. travel restrictions which enhances the regime’s currency reserves and undermines
our overall policy goals of minimizing direct subsidies to the regime” (Report, 31).
Table V. The 3rd Actantial model of the Chapter 1— Deny Revenues to the Cuban
Dictatorship (28-44).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States and especially its Cuban population living in
Florida.
the U.S. government.
to deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship for example by
undermining the Regime-sustaining tourism and by limiting the
Regime’s manipulation of Humanitarian U.S. policies.
the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
the Castro regime.
Especially the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other
countries, organisations and people who support the current
government economically— consciously or unconsciously.
the Cuban people.
The sender is the United States. Again, the United States is presented as the subject and the
Cuban people as the receiver. The object is to deny revenues to the Cuban dictatorship for
example by undermining the regime-sustaining tourism and by limiting the regime’s
manipulation of humanitarian U.S. policies. Anti-subject is the dictator Fidel Castro and his
regime. The helpers of the subject are the Western world and the civil society in Cuba. The
helper of the anti-subject is especially the government of Hugo Chavéz, and other countries,
organisations and people who support the current government economically— consciously or
unconsciously— for example in connection with tourism. According Siltala (2000, 22) there
is a contradiction between the public rhetoric and the private action of the Cuban community
in the U.S.; publicly many Cuban-Americans support the economic blockade, whereas
privately  they  send  so  much  money  to  Cuba  that  it  exceeds  the  net  incomes  the  Cuban
government receives from tourism. The threat is the strengthening of the Castro regime.
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4. Illuminate the Reality of Castro’s Cuba (44-45):
When in the last chapter the Report wanted the Americans not to be so naïve, in this chapter
the aim is to convince the rest of the Western world of the misery Castro has caused to
Cubans by keeping the dictatorship alive.
Table VI. The 4th Actantial model of the Chapter 1— Illuminate the Reality of Castro’s
Cuba (44-45).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States.
the U.S. government and NGOs
Illumination of the reality of Castro’s Cuba, including its threat
potential.
the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
the Castro regime.
— .
the Cuban people.
The sender is the United States. The U.S. government is presented as the subject and the
Cuban people as the receiver. The object is to illuminate the reality of Castro’s Cuba,
including its threat potential. Anti-subject is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The
helpers of the subject are the Western world and the civil society in Cuba. The opponent is
not apparent. The threat is that people do not believe that Cuba will become a threat to the
Western world.
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5. Encourage International Diplomatic Efforts to Support Cuban Civil Society and
Challenge the Castro Regime (45-50):
Now, especially after the “2003 crackdown on peaceful pro-democracy activists” (Report,
45), when the international community understands, how the current regime in Cuba is
harmful to Cubans, it should support the civil society in Cuba and challenge the Castro
regime. The Report (45) accuses the international community of lacking in actions: “All too
frequently, moral outrage and international condemnation have not translated into real
actions that directly assist the Cuban people in their quest for freedom and basic human
rights”. This chapter focuses on encouraging the international actors to assist the U.S. in
challenging the Castro Regime.
Table  VII.  The  5th Actantial model of the Chapter 1— Encourage International
Diplomatic Efforts to Support Cuban Civil Society and Challenge the Castro Regime
(45-50).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States.
the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs.
Encouragement of international efforts to support Cuban civil
society and challenge the Castro regime.
the international actors such as the European Union (EU) and
the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the civil
society in Cuba.
the Castro regime.
—.
the Cuban people.
The sender is again the United States. The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs are
presented as the subjects and the Cuban people as the receiver. The object is to encourage
international efforts to support Cuban civil society and to challenge the Castro regime.
Anti-subject is the dictator Fidel Castro and his regime. The helpers of the subject are the
international actors such as the European Union and the International Labor Organization
(ILO), and the civil society in Cuba. The opponent is not apparent. The threat is that the
international diplomatic efforts will support the regime instead of the civil society.
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6. Undermine the Regime’s “Succession Strategy” (50-52):
The last chapter brings forth the physical and mental deterioration of Castro. According to
the Report the senior Cuban leadership is preparing to the “’succession’ of the regime that
will keep the senior leadership in power” (Report, 51). It continues that is time for also the
U.S. government to prepare for this change by preventing the “succession” by its policies.
“U.S. policy must be targeted at undermining this succession strategy by stripping away
layers of support within the regime, creating uncertainty regarding the political and legal
future of those in leadership positions, and encouraging more of those within the ruling elite
to shift their allegiance to those pro-democracy forces working for a transition to a free and
democratic Cuba” (Report, 51).
Table VIII. The 6th Actantial model of the Chapter 1— Undermine the Regime’s
“Succession Strategy” (50-52).
Actantial Position Actor
Sender
Subject
Object
Helpers
Anti-Subjects
Opponents
Receiver
the United States.
the U.S. government, agencies and NGOs.
Undermining the regime’s “succession strategy” by supporting
a democratic transition.
the Western world, civil society in Cuba.
the Castro regime.
—.
the Cuban people.
The sender is once more the United States. The U.S. government, agencies and NGOs are the
subjects and the Cuban people are the receivers. The object is to undermine the regime’s
“succession strategy” by supporting a democratic transition. Anti-subject is the Castro
regime. The helpers of the subject are the Western world and the civil society in Cuba. The
helper of the anti-subject is not mentioned. Only in one of the actantial models I was able to
find an opponent aka a helper of the anti-subject. This may be deliberate; the U.S. may want
to create an impression that the Castro’s Regime does not have any friends, which makes the
supporting of the efforts of the United States even easier. Or then Cuba does no longer have
any significant allies, as it use to have the Soviet Union.
